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Johnson: Lying at Plea Bargaining

LYING AT PLEA BARGAINING
Thea Johnson*
ABSTRACT
This Article describes the regular use of lying during plea
bargaining by criminal justice stakeholders and the paradox it
presents for those who care about creating a fairer criminal legal
system. The paradox is this: lying at plea bargaining allows defendants
the opportunity to negotiate fair resolutions to their cases in the face
of a deeply unfair system, even as that lying makes way for—and
sustains—the problematic system it seeks to avoid.
The Article lays out a taxonomy of lying at plea bargaining by
organizing the types of lies into three categories: lies about facts, lies
about law, and lies about process. The criminal justice system
produces a litany of injustices. Implicitly authorized, systemic lying
offers a means of dealing with these perceived injustices. But lying also
obscures the system from public view by hiding and relieving pressure
points via plea bargaining.
What seems like the natural solution—to make the system more
transparent and less flexible—would likely harm individual
defendants. If lying at plea bargaining disappeared tomorrow, many
defendants would suffer dire consequences, such as deportation for
minor charges or subjection to outrageous mandatory minimum
sentences. These defendants would lose their ability to avoid the
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Moore, Justin Murray, Anthony O’Rourke, Anna Roberts, Matthew Shapiro, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Jenia
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injustices of the system. Yet lying at plea bargaining is the result of a
series of interlocking mandatory laws and rules that many
stakeholders believe are deeply unfair and should be reformed. Thus,
lying at plea bargaining is both a means of avoiding injustice and a
force prohibiting meaningful reformation of the laws and rules that
produce such injustice. Examining this paradox leads to the
conclusion that reform must focus on overhaul, not piecemeal
correction. In a system so entangled that lying is the only way to reach
a just resolution, solutions that focus simply on producing more
transparency or flexibility are unlikely to lead to meaningful
transformation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, a defendant was charged in Virginia with transporting
marijuana; he eventually pleaded guilty to trafficking a different type
of drug, despite the fact that all parties, including the court, agreed he
possessed only marijuana. 1 That same year in New York, a defendant
faced animal cruelty charges, which through a bit of legal alchemy
became a trespass conviction, although the defendant did not, in fact,
commit a trespass.2 Ten years earlier in Kansas, a court allowed
another defendant to plead guilty to attempted second-degree
unintentional murder, even while acknowledging that no such crime
existed in the statute books. 3 In each of these cases, the defendant
pleaded guilty on the record to a lie: to a crime he did not commit, to
a crime that did not reflect the true nature of his conduct, and even to
a crime that did not exist.
But each of these lies also achieved something important for the
defendant and the other stakeholders in the plea process. They allowed
the parties to resolve the cases in a way that led them to some rough
form of justice—a justice that would not be available if the case had
been resolved with a plea that did not rely on a lie. The process
therefore allowed the parties to sidestep the law without changing the
law. Indeed, this is what plea bargaining achieves every day in
courtrooms across the country. It provides a mechanism to negotiate
around—often unfair—laws. At the same time, it helps keep those
laws intact by diverting problems with their impact into the realm of
plea bargaining rather than law reform.
This Article explores lying at plea bargaining to tell a story about
plea bargaining more broadly. Indeed, the lies described here are plea
bargaining, not a secretive adjunct to the process. But the focus on
lying centers our attention on the paradox at the heart of plea
bargaining: pleas help resolve injustice, while making sure the laws
that create such injustice remain unchanged. And the lies that the

1. Commonwealth v. Ayala, 99 Va. Cir. 374, 374–75 (2018).
2. People v. Freeman, 52 N.Y.S.3d 340, 341–42 (App. Div. 2017).
3. McPherson v. State, 163 P.3d 1257, 1261, 1264 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
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parties tell at plea bargaining serve as the most powerful case study for
this paradox.
To demonstrate this paradox, this Article does two things. First, it
identifies a taxonomy of lies one sees at plea bargaining. These lies
fall into three broad categories: lies about facts, lies about law, and lies
about process. Depending on one’s perspective, the criminal justice
system produces a litany of injustices. 4 Implicitly authorized, systemic
lying5 offers a means of dealing with these perceived injustices, and as
the taxonomy below demonstrates, lying assists stakeholders in
avoiding the results of unfair laws or inequitable outcomes. In many
cases, the stakeholders in charge of producing those inequitable
outcomes simply work around the system through often invisible lies.

4. Here is just a brief list of some of the injustices that the criminal system has either produced or
exacerbated. Studies have found that explicit and implicit bias create unequal outcomes for Black
defendants. See generally, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS, & MARY CROWLEY, VERA
INST.
OF
JUST.,
RACE
AND
PROSECUTION
IN
MANHATTAN
(2014),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/race-and-prosecution-inmanhattan/legacy_downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R87CL366] (finding that race played a role in prosecutorial decision-making at nearly every step of the criminal
process). Poor communities of color are often fined in predatory ways. See, e.g., C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,
INVESTIGATION
OF
THE
FERGUSON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
52–54
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GZ5RKENU]. Children have been put on the sex offender registry. Sarah Stillman, The List, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/when-kids-are-accused-of-sex-crimes
[https://perma.cc/8J5L-K3S8] (detailing the stories of individuals on sex offender registries for sexual
conduct they engaged in while teens or pre-teens). And grandmothers who committed small infractions
discover that they will be deported to countries they have never known. See Richard Gonzales, Immigrant
Felons and Deportation: One Grandmother’s Case, NPR (Apr. 9, 2016, 9:25 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/04/09/473503408/immigrant-felons-and-deportation-one-grandmothers-casefor-pardon [https://perma.cc/TXT8-EW69]. There is also strong evidence that innocent men have been
put to death. E.g., Maurice Possley & The Marshall Project, A Dad Was Executed for Deaths of His 3
Girls.
Now
a
Letter
Casts
More
Doubt.,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
9,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/letter-from-witness-casts-further-doubt-on-2004-texasexecution/2015/03/09/d9ebdab8-c451-11e4-ad5c-3b8ce89f1b89_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DXQ7MWS9]. From a victim’s rights perspective, the case of Jeffrey Epstein makes clear that justice is also
often in short order for victims. See Dave Davies, Everyone Heard About Jeffrey Epstein’s Enablers. Few
Listened
to
His
Victims,
NPR
(July
20,
2021,
11:44
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/20/1017968999/jeffrey-epsteins-victims-speak-out-in-perversion-ofjustice-by-julie-k-brown [https://perma.cc/79BA-VDY5] (discussing how Jeffrey Epstein pleaded guilty
in 2006 to a 13-month jail sentence for sexual activity with dozens of teenage girls); Who Was Jeffrey
Epstein? The Financier Charged with Sex Trafficking, BBC (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48913377 [https://perma.cc/357L-88FD].
5. I borrow this term from Julia Simon-Kerr, who coined the term in her piece, Systemic Lying, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175 (2015).
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Thus, untruthful plea bargains allow defendants to avoid sex offender
registration, deportation, severe prison sentences, or fines. In some
cases, untruthful pleas have even allowed innocent defendants to avoid
the death penalty.6
Second, this Article explores the paradox that these lies reveal and
what they tell us about the prospects of meaningful criminal justice
reform. For many defendants, lying offers the only way to escape
injustice in their individual cases. Yet such lying makes it impossible
to fundamentally improve the broader criminal system, which would
make the lies unnecessary in the first place. Or put another way,
lawyers have created strategies to resolve cases fairly in an unfair
system, and these strategies exist because the modern plea process is
simultaneously very flexible and not transparent. These strategies
obscure how the system would function if it worked as designed,
making it difficult or even impossible to transform the unfair laws and
policies that lawyers and judges find themselves scrambling to work
around.
The taxonomy then leads to a critical finding for criminal justice
reformers, local and federal legislators, and a public with a renewed
interest in the criminal system. In any given jurisdiction, the scope and
size of the current criminal system is profound, characterized by
thousands of criminal statutes, numerous sentencing schemes, and a
bewildering array of collateral consequences. Although, in theory,
these “inputs” should produce a defined set of potential “outputs” (in
other words, the charges, sentences, and other penalties that an
individual defendant faces), they do not. Instead, as seen in the
examples at the start of this Article, the parties involved stretch and
bend each individual case until they reach a desired resolution.
This flexibility without boundaries is made possible by the lack of
transparency at plea bargaining. Both those working inside the
criminal system and those peering in have no real understanding of
how this morass of laws would work if plea bargaining did not serve

6. Gerald L. Shargel, West Memphis Three Freed Using Rare Alford Legal Plea, DAILY BEAST,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/west-memphis-three-freed-using-rare-alford-legal-plea
[https://perma.cc/444D-R2TJ] (July 13, 2017, 8:27 PM).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/8

6

Johnson: Lying at Plea Bargaining

2022]

LYING AT PLEA BARGAINING

679

as a safety valve for many of its worst features. That said, although
efforts to make the system more transparent (and, by extension, less
flexible) would result in fewer lies and a better understanding of the
system, these efforts would also do tremendous harm to individual
defendants. If we imagine lying at plea bargaining disappearing
tomorrow, defendants throughout the criminal system would lose their
primary means of circumventing the injustices of the system. They
would feel real, immediate harm.
Hence, the paradox also presents a reformer’s dilemma that pits
transparency and truth against flexibility and individualized notions of
justice. Lying at plea bargaining continues because it allows
defendants the opportunity to negotiate fair resolutions to their cases
in the face of an unfair system, even as that lying makes way for—and
sustains—the unfair laws it seeks to avoid. In an entrenched system,
should a reformer who cares about justice embrace transparency or
keep the system functioning as is? This dilemma reflects real debates
among lawyers and policymakers, both seeking a path towards fairer
outcomes.
As this Article demonstrates, the dichotomy between saving the
system or the individuals who are processed through that system often
ignores broader visions of transformation that do not fit neatly into
either category. The Movement for Black Lives and abolitionist
movements present at least one such reimagining, which highlight how
reform around the edges does not address the systemic injustice at the
core of our criminal system. Indeed, we must recognize that the lies in
the taxonomy described here are workarounds for a system so barbaric
that lawyers are willing to lie to help defendants avoid the worst of it.
Such a system will not be fixed through more transparency or more
flexibility for the stakeholders. Rather, the paradox presented here
calls for a reconceptualization of the system as a whole.
Part I of this Article explores the ways in which trials—the natural
comparison point for pleas—constrain and discourage outright lying.
It then identifies the characteristics of the plea process that make lying
both possible and probable. Part II details the taxonomy of plea
bargaining lies, which include lies about facts, lies about law, and lies
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about process. Finally, Part III explores how this taxonomy of lies
demonstrates the paradox of plea bargaining, namely that the strategies
lawyers have come up with to avoid the injustices of the system are the
same strategies that make the system unknowable to those outside of
it, thus allowing the core injustice of the criminal system to survive.
Part III then offers some solutions to improve the current model but
makes clear that such solutions will not disentangle the laws,
sentencing schemes, and mandatory collateral consequences that
encourage lying in the first place.
I. TRIALS, PLEAS, AND LIES
In 1966, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth . . . .”7 This purported goal of the
criminal system makes sense. A system that seeks truth will likely
produce just results. Truth does not guarantee justice but “is an
essential precondition for it. Public legitimacy, as much as justice,
demands accuracy in verdicts.”8
Even though trials are largely vanishing from the criminal system, 9
scholars and courts have examined plea bargaining and its relationship
to trials because the comparison remains useful. There is a large body
of constitutional and procedural law that has developed around trials
with the goal of making trial outcomes fairer and more accurate. The
7. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
8. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 2
(2006).
9. Vanishing Trials, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/Landing/VanishingTrials [https://perma.cc/L8KS-JRQY] (showing that in fiscal year 2018, 90% of federal criminal cases
ended in guilty pleas, 8% of cases were dismissed, and only 2% went to trial); Benjamin Weiser, Trial by
Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closeddoors.html [https://perma.cc/TM5B-8QMY] (documenting that even in Manhattan Federal District Court,
criminal trials are exceedingly rare, with one judge recalling only one criminal trial in his four years on
the bench). In addition, there were no criminal trials in Santa Cruz County in Arizona from 2010 until at
least 2012. Marisa Gerber, No Criminal Trials Held in Santa Cruz County Since 2010, NOGALES INT’L,
https://www.nogalesinternational.com/scv_sun/news/no-criminal-trials-held-in-santa-cruz-countysince/article_2651fbde-5269-11e1-b903-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/NR99-ZBVE] (Nov. 21,
2012); see generally Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99 (2018) (discussing the various factors why
federal criminal trials have decreased over several decades).
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outcomes produced by plea bargaining have received much less
attention from courts. Thus, scholars and courts ask: what trial rights
should extend to a defendant at plea bargaining? Is plea bargaining
done in the shadow of the trial? What is the goal of plea bargaining
beyond trial avoidance? And most importantly, should plea
bargaining’s basic purpose be the determination of truth?
Truth-seeking is a foundational goal of the trial, even though, as a
practical matter, the truth may not always emerge. There are many
ways in which the legal system messages that trials are truth-seeking
endeavors. For instance, truth appears as a core principle of the
adversarial system throughout opinions by the Supreme Court and
lower courts;10 the overarching logic of the rules of evidence places
truth as a central value;11 and studies on public perceptions note that
trials are understood to be spaces where truth emerges.12 As such,
explicit lies are generally prohibited at trials, and there are many ways
10. E.g., Shott, 382 U.S. at 416; United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The
purpose of the [prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence] is not simply to correct an imbalance
of advantage, whereby the prosecution may surprise the defense at trial with new evidence; rather, it is
also to make of the trial a search for truth informed by all relevant material, much of which, because of
imbalance in investigative resources, will be exclusively in the hands of the Government.”), abrogated by
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1250 (Mass.
2003) (“The duties imposed on a criminal defense lawyer (zealous advocacy, preservation of client
confidences, avoidance of a conflict of interest) and the constitutional rights granted a defendant (effective
legal representation, opportunity to testify in his own defense, right to a fair trial) are circumscribed by
what we demand of honorable lawyers and the core principle of our judicial system that seeks to make a
trial a search for truth.”); Commonwealth v. Iseley, 615 A.2d 408, 414 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[G]iven
that the accuracy of any subsequent trial (should the prosecution ever reach that stage) is dependent upon
the ever fading memories and increasingly uncertain availabilities of the necessary witnesses, the power
to prolong the prosecution could serve as a Sword of Damocles for the guilty defendant to suspend over
the very heart of the trial, the search for truth.”); Commonwealth v. Wall, 606 A.2d 449, 457 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (“In Pennsylvania, we have come to resolve this question [on the rape shield law] through a
relatively elaborate procedure which is designed to ensure that no evidence of the victim’s sexual history
is introduced unless and until it can be established that to exclude such evidence would lay victim to the
very raison d’etre of the trial itself: the pursuit of truth. The process begins with the defendant submitting
a specific proffer to the court of exactly what evidence he or she seeks to admit and precisely why it is
relevant to the defense.” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Molina, 468 N.Y.S.2d 551, 559 (Crim. Ct. 1983)
(“The trial of a criminal charge should be a sober search for truth . . . .”), rev’d, 494 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App.
Div. 1985).
11. FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly,
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”).
12. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of
Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095,
1095–96 (2014).
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in which trials require the truth. Witnesses must testify under oath 13
and can be punished with a perjury charge if they fail to tell the truth. 14
In theory, evidence rules exclude unreliable evidence and highlight
reliable evidence.15 A series of ethical rules also require candor by the
parties before the tribunal. 16 Finally, cross-examination is intended to
be an “engine” for truth-seeking, allowing adverse parties to root out
dishonesty or other flaws in witness testimony. 17 Thus, trials are the
means by which we discover what really happened in a criminal case,
even though truth is not always prioritized at trial or may not be
absolutely knowable.18
13. FED. R. EVID. 603.
14. Allison Douglis, Note, Disentangling Perjury and Lying, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 339, 353
(2017).
15. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule (“‘[T]he rule
requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an
opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of
the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting EDWARD W. CLEARLY, VAUGHN C. BALL, RALPH C. BARNHART, KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE
E. DIX, ERNEST GELLHORN, ROBERT MEISENHOLDER, E.F. ROBERTS ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 10, at 20 (2d ed. 1972))); FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring expert testimony have indicia of
reliability for admission). But see, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts), 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 22 (2016) (“[I]n contrast to hearsay and character evidence rules, . . . ‘exclusion of relevant
evidence’ Rules are not attempting to increase the likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond with
what actually happened. Rather, these Rules make the exact opposite choice—these Rules keep out
evidence that does bear on determining what happened, and they do so on the assumption that, while such
evidence would be helpful, there nonetheless are valid reasons to ignore it.” (emphasis omitted)).
16. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“This Rule sets
forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity
of the adjudicative process.”).
17. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means by
which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”).
18. For instance, many forms of reliable, trustworthy evidence are excluded. Reliable evidence of a
crime may be suppressed if a court finds that a defendant was searched in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See generally, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (finding prosecution’s use of
evidence of obscene material obtained through a search without a search warrant violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments). The rules of evidence and the Constitution exclude certain types of testimony,
even where there is a little doubt that the testimony is trustworthy. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 39–40, 61 (2004) (finding prosecution’s use of spouse’s recorded statements to police when spouse
did not testify violated the Confrontation Clause because confronting witnesses via cross-examination,
not a judge, determines reliability of evidence). Deeply flawed forensic science, which often borders (or
crosses) the line into pseudo-science, has been used in trials for decades, and rules of evidence tend not
to prohibit such bunk. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the
Ground Up, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 286 (2014) (“Unreliable science presents itself in a
virtual smorgasbord of ways, from the routine (contamination) to the egregious (forensic misconduct) and
everything in between (misrepresented or exaggerated results, misinterpretation of results, lack of research
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But plea bargaining as a practice does not share the deep roots of
trials. Plea bargaining only became commonplace in the 1920s 19 and
did not receive a stamp of approval from the Supreme Court until
1970.20 Plea bargaining became popular in the early twentieth century
for two reasons: first, because it allowed judges and lawyers to hide
their own corrupt practices—namely, using bribes to grant defendants
a beneficial plea deal—and second, because the normalized use of
pleas allowed courts an efficient means of dealing with the burdens of
a rapidly expanding criminal system. 21 The history of plea bargaining
demonstrates that pleas were always open to manipulation and
corruption.22 As a result, early courts were suspicious of plea
bargaining.
A modern view of plea bargaining shows that as a matter of law and
practice, those fears were well-founded; it is much easier to lie during
a guilty plea than to lie at trial. This is because the plea process, unlike
the trial, is both a flexible instrument for resolving cases and often
hidden from public view. As Jenia I. Turner wrote in her review of the
many problems produced by plea bargaining’s lack of transparency,
“[t]he opacity of plea bargaining stands in marked contrast to the
constitutional commitment to public criminal proceedings, enshrined

for basic assumptions, unqualified analysts, inconsistent lab practices).”). In addition, in both practice and
according to the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state rules, trial judges leave it to the parties to
determine how to present their cases. See FED. R. EVID. 102. This means that a neutral judge does not
decide what evidence should be presented to the jury to prove the “truth.” Rather, she relies on the
adversaries to make those calls, even while we understand that the parties may not be motivated to present
a full picture of the case.
19. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1979); see
also Lucian E. Dervan, Class v. United States: Bargained Justice and a System of Efficiencies, 2018 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 113, 121 (“[I]n the early 20th century, bribes were sometimes used to secure ‘bargains’
containing reduced sentences. This was particularly prevalent in Chicago, where ‘fixers,’ located in front
of the courthouse, arranged deals for defendants. . . . [A]s overcriminalization became more prominent in
the United States after the turn of the century, court systems in the early 1900s became overburdened and
unable to process the increasing number of cases appearing on the dockets. This issue was particularly
pronounced during the [P]rohibition era as the number of offenses and offenders swelled. In response,
prosecutors began offering defendants incentives to plead guilty to help clear dockets and reduce
caseloads.” (footnotes omitted)).
20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
21. Dervan, supra note 19.
22. See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 19–22.
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in the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and the First
Amendment right of public access to the courts.”23
Constitutionally, plea bargains have few formal requirements. The
primary requirement, with some exceptions, 24 is that the defendant
accepts guilt.25 Plea bargains involve the waiver of several rights, such
as the right to a trial or the right to confront one’s accusers.26 Like other
constitutional waivers, the defendant can only give up such rights if
the plea is made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”27 One
basic premise of a guilty plea is that to secure the bargain of a plea, the
defendant relinquishes, among other rights, his trial and appeal
rights.28 This practice has, of course, resulted in fewer appeals on
23. Jenia I. Turner, Transparency in Plea Bargaining, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 975 (2021).
24. For example, Alford pleas allow the defendant to enter a plea without admitting guilt. See generally
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Such pleas will be discussed in greater depth in Part II.C.2.
25. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
26. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969)).
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (defining the requirements for the waiver of a
constitutional right); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”). The requirements for a knowing and voluntary plea include
that defendants must understand what rights they are giving up, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 & n.5 (explaining
that a guilty plea waiver involves the waiver of many constitutional rights, including “[the] privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, [the] right to trial by jury, and [the] right to confront [one’s]
accusers” (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969))); the defendant must also know
what he is pleading to, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (finding that a guilty plea is
invalid “unless the defendant received ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him’” (quoting
Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941))); the defendant must also understand the direct consequence
of the plea, as well as the immigration consequences of the plea, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369
(2010).
28. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution
does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant.”). Some states have laws that preclude a defendant from challenging
guilt after a plea, even where there is later evidence of innocence. People v. Reed, 2019 IL App (4th)
170090, ¶ 21, 125 N.E.3d 480, 485 (finding a defendant who pleads guilty may not raise a post-conviction
claim of actual innocence); People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 516 (N.Y. 2018) (“[A] guilty plea entered
in proceedings where the record demonstrates the conviction was constitutionally obtained will
presumptively foreclose an independent actual innocence claim.”); Owusu v. Warden, No. CV154007214,
2018 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3678, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2018) (“[A] valid guilty plea[]
constitute[s] a waiver of the right to bring [a] . . . claim of actual innocence.”); see also Sari Horwitz, DOJ
to Amend Competent Counsel Waiver Practices as Holder Prepares to Step Down, WASH. POST (Oct. 14,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/doj-to-amend-competent-counsel-waiver-practices-as-holder-prepares-to-stepdown/2014/10/14/465efbde-53ba-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html [https://perma.cc/27BE-ZUL8]
(noting federal prosecutors may “no longer ask criminal defendants to waive their future claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in plea agreements”).
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issues involving plea bargains and further hid the realities of the plea
system.
But the Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue only tells a sliver
of the story. Plea bargaining is a local creature. As Andrew Manuel
Crespo explains, plea bargaining is controlled not only by substantive
and constitutional criminal law but also by the “subconstitutional
procedural law of the states—an interlocking set of legal frameworks
that comprises the law of joinder and severance, the law of preclusion,
the law of cumulative sentencing, the law of pretrial charge review, the
law of dismissal and amendment, and the law of lesser offenses.”29
Although these interlocking legal frameworks constrain prosecutors to
some extent, they also make plea bargains more difficult to understand
and regulate in any sort of generalized way.
Beyond the law, the local practice of judges and attorneys also
control plea bargaining. Within the same courthouse, one judge may
agree to accept Alford pleas,30 while another may not. Some judges
insist on a full memorialized record for every plea, whereas others
merely accept the agreements of the parties.31 As one judge in Ohio
put it, there are “disparate judicial philosophies that exist and operate
among the hundreds of state court judges regarding the judge’s role in
the plea negotiation process[,] . . . [and] each individual judge has his
or her own approach [to the plea process] . . . .”32
The formal and informal polices of a prosecutor’s office also play a
critical role in regulating plea bargains, and those policies are difficult
to pin down with any sort of specificity. Although some prosecutors
have recently prioritized publishing their office policies,33 many
29. Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1306
(2018).
30. An Alford plea is a plea that allows a defendant to accept a conviction while claiming innocence
on the record. See infra Part II.C.2.
31. Jenia I. Turner, Virtual Guilty Pleas, 24 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 211, 227–28 (2022) (noting that judges
may not require the parties to produce a factual record, even where local rules of criminal procedure
require production).
32. Michael P. Donnelly, Truth or Consequences: Making the Case for Transparency and Reform in
the Plea Negotiation Process, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 423, 427 (2020).
33. Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM.
JUST. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2019) (describing efforts toward greater transparency on charging policies taken
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formal policies remain secret, available only to the attorneys in the
office.34 In addition, unwritten policies may exist in a particular office.
Rachael Rollins, the former District Attorney for Suffolk County in
Massachusetts, noted that her open policy of not charging certain types
of crimes explicitly adopted the unspoken policies of her
predecessors.35 The fact that she publicized a previously secret policy
makes clear how difficult it is to understand the local level regulation
of plea and charge bargaining. Even more narrowly, individual
prosecutors—despite office-wide policies—may have their own sense
of justice in any individual case and therefore their own internal rules
for plea bargaining.36
This combination of lax constitutional norms and wide-ranging
procedural rules, along with a nearly endless number of formal and
informal polices governing any particular jurisdiction, means that plea
bargaining is, at best, loosely regulated. Plea bargaining has, in fact,
become much more like a system of civil settlement with the parties
negotiating along multiple paths. 37 Although there is evidence that
by two elected progressive prosecutors: Kim Foxx, who has publicized revised charging policies of the
Cook County State Attorney’s office; and Larry Krasner, who published a memo to prosecutors in the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s office revising charging and sentencing policies for “marijuana
possession, possession of marijuana paraphernalia, or prostitution” to “divert more cases and . . . offer
more plea deals that would result in lower sentences” and “charge only the level of homicide that can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt” to prevent “overcharging to gain an advantage at the plea-bargaining
stage,” as well as requiring prosecutors to obtain Krasner’s approval “on any plea offer that exceeds fifteen
to thirty years in prison”).
34. Brad Heath, Rules to Keep Federal Prosecutors in Line Revealed, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/03/justice-department-discovery-policiesreleased/24239225/ [https://perma.cc/7YC5-8J84] (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:44 PM).
35. Rachael Rollins, Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Att’y, Panel Remarks at NYU School of Law’s Center on the
Administration of Criminal Law Conference: Plea Bargaining: Reforming an (Un)Necessary Evil?, at
6:00–7:32, 15:33, 19:25–22:15 (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/zimroth/events/pleabargaining (click on video “Whither the Prosecutor?”).
36. Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuits of Justice for Noncitizen
Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 36 (2012) (studying the varying ways that Brooklyn prosecutors dealt with
defendants facing immigration consequences); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An
Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1163–65, 1180–88 (2013)
(discussing how Los Angeles prosecutors are willing to take into account immigration consequences when
deciding plea offers versus Maricopa County, Arizona, where prosecutors actively use immigration
consequences as a means of enforcing federal immigration law).
37. Richard Lorren Jolly & J.J. Prescott, Beyond Plea Bargaining: A Theory of Criminal Settlement,
62 B.C. L. REV. 1047, 1073 (2021) (noting that although in criminal law the parties cannot reach full
settlement without the agreement of the judge, they “partially” negotiate in many ways, for instance by
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lawyers in specific jurisdictions often ascribe a “set price” to certain
charges that provide the parties some guidance on the likely sentence
offer in a case,38 it remains difficult to say how a specific set of charges
and a defendant’s particular background will calculate at plea
bargaining. In this environment, lying can flourish.
II. A TAXONOMY OF LYING
In both legal39 and philosophical40 literature, there are various views
of what constitutes a lie, and as other scholars have observed,
identifying and evaluating lying is a common problem in the legal
system,41 not just during plea bargaining. For the purposes of the
taxonomy of lies below, I adopt the “correspondence” theory of truth,
which holds that “a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity—a
fact—to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief is
false.”42 Correspondence theory looks to the world, using facts as its
agreeing to modify the procedures, the substantive issues to be resolved, or the potential outcomes
available).
38. Id. at 1062 (noting that system resources influence the “going rate for settling” a case); Bryan C.
McCannon, Prosecutors and Plea Bargains, in A SYSTEM OF PLEAS: SOCIAL SCIENCE’S CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE REAL LEGAL SYSTEM 56, 56, 59, 71–72 (Vanessa A. Edkins & Allison D. Redlich eds., 2019).
39. Here is a small sample of the many articles that attempt to define and interrogate the idea of truth
and lies in the legal system. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Honesty Without Truth: Lies, Accuracy, and
the Criminal Justice Process, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2018); Douglis, supra note 14; Ariel
Porat & Omir Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, 91 IND. L.J. 617 (2016); W. Bradley Wendel,
Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J.L. &
HUMANS. 105 (2016); Michael S. Moore, the Plain Truth About Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23 (2003); W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law:
Misdirection, Lying, and “Lying with an Explanation,” 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53 (2002).
40. See generally S ISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978)
(discussing certain kinds of lies and why people lie).
41. See Courtney M. Cox, Legitimizing Lies, 90 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 6–11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3800537 [https://perma.cc/NV8T-3M9B]
(discussing different philosophies and methods for determining what is lying).
42. Michael Glanzberg, Truth, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. ARCHIVE (emphasis omitted),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth/ [https://perma.cc/Q32R-859X] (Aug. 16, 2018).
For a lie to exist, there must be some conception of truth. When it comes to truth, the most significant
theories in contemporary literature are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth,
each of which assumes that the concept of truth exists. Id. I also acknowledge that there are various
versions of “truth” in a courtroom. As one scholar put it, “[t]rial courts concern themselves daily with
three very different meanings of truth that are not necessarily compatible: veracity, accuracy and a just
(or true) verdict.” Marilyn J. Ireland, Deconstructing Hearsay’s Structure: Toward a Witness Recollection
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benchmarks of truth, to verify a given belief as true. 43 It is enough to
say that, as with a trial, there is an expectation that a rough
correspondence exists between the elements of a crime a defendant
pleads to and the acts he committed. And where parties knowingly
enter pleas that have no such correspondence, there is lying in plea
bargaining.
The lies I discuss here are of a different nature than legal fictions, a
commonly used device in the legal system that allows the system to
function. Legal fictions are not meant to deceive; rather, both those
inside and outside of the process understand the role of the legal fiction
in the transaction or resolution. 44 Lying at plea bargaining, on the other
hand, is deception. Even if all criminal justice actors involved
understand that the plea may be a lie, the plea deceives the outside
world. The record of conviction reflects not the truth as the parties
believe it to be, but rather the agreement they crafted. The lie at plea
bargaining is transformed into truth for all future purposes.45
Plea bargains based on lies do not reflect the parties’ understanding
of the truth of the defendant’s conduct. Meaning, at least one or more
of the parties—defense attorney, prosecutor, or judge—know or
genuinely believe that the plea is not a reflection of the defendant’s
conduct. Yet they allow the plea to proceed. I borrow the term
“genuinely believe” from the legal ethicist Marvin Frankel to indicate
something beyond mere speculation or guesswork.46 We often suspect
something might be true or false based on gut feeling or a survey of
the facts, but genuine belief signifies that the party, after a full review
of the available evidence, truly believes the plea does not indicate

Definition of Hearsay, 43 VILL. L. REV. 529, 546 (1998). By embracing the correspondence theory, my
focus here is on accuracy and on the veracity of the statements made by stakeholders as to the accuracy
of the verdict. I reject that a just verdict is necessarily a “true” one, even while I acknowledge there may
be justice in a false verdict. For more on how to define lies, see Cox, supra note 41 (manuscript at 9–14).
43. Glanzberg, supra note 42.
44. Legal fictions are a commonly used device in the legal system, which are not actually meant to
deceive anyone, but rather assist the parties in establishing certain rights or responsibilities. Thea Johnson,
Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 897 (2019). As scholars have noted, “[t]hey serve as ‘an enabler,’
allowing the ‘application of the law to novel legal questions and circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Nancy J.
Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 9 (2010)).
45. Id.
46. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 73 (1980).
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truth.47 I exclude the defendant as one of the parties from this list
because the defendant is generally the only person who has full
knowledge of the facts of his conduct, but that truth is not always
ascertainable by, or even clear to, others.
Furthermore, lying at plea bargaining involves a party (or parties)
understanding some version of the case’s truth but then presenting a
different version in court. The lying I describe here is not necessarily
perjury.48 Nor does it require that some party tell a lie under oath. That
said, lies in plea bargaining are formalized. Even when a plea is not
taken under oath, there is an understanding that a plea, unlike a civil
settlement, represents a truthful and accurate record. 49 This is what
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 calls for,50 as do most states’

47. On the other side of the coin, if one genuinely believes something is incorrect, that is not a lie. As
the scholar Marvin Frankel put it when defining truth in the courtroom setting, “[y]ou may be wrong when
you ‘genuinely believe’ you saw your neighbor’s cat yesterday. But if you do believe it and you say so,
you’re telling the ‘truth’ . . . .” Id.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 defines the crime of perjury as:
Whoever—
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case
in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury
as permitted under [§] 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as
true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
49. Although under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 plea negotiations are prohibited from being used
against a defendant, the plea itself can be admitted against a defendant at a future trial under Federal Rule
of Evidence 609, and statements made during plea negotiations that result in a final plea of guilty are also
admissible. FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. EVID. 609; United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir.
1990). Although as Brandon Garrett notes, one of the reasons pleas are not confessions is because they
are not administered under a formal oath. Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415, 1417 (2016).
50. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires the court to “determine that there is a factual basis
for [a] plea.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). Per the advisory notes for Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11, “[w]here inquiry is made of the defendant himself it may be desirable practice to place the defendant
under oath.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment. Although formal
swearing in is not required, Rule 11 still does require the judge to determine that there is an accurate—in
other words, truthful—basis for the plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
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local rules.51 Plea bargains based on lies are thus entered into the
record as the truth, as any other guilty plea would be.
Finally, the lies described below are all made possible by two
fundamental features of the broader plea system—a lack of
transparency and an abundance of flexibility. These lies represent how
these features allow for the parties to stretch and bend the truth in often
extreme ways.
With these characteristics in mind, I present below a brief taxonomy
of plea bargaining’s lies. This taxonomy is descriptive—a means to
help us understand what lying at plea bargaining looks like. I do not
mean to identify any of the lies here as either “bad” or “good,” but
rather to showcase the ways in which plea bargains regularly result in
lies,52 and that such lies conflict with our understanding of the
outcomes produced by plea bargaining.
A. Lies About Facts
I begin the taxonomy with lies about facts. In these pleas, the parties
manipulate the facts to achieve a desired result. For example, a case
starts with a charging document detailing the facts. That charging
document itself may be flawed, but the collection of facts through
investigation allows the parties to come to some understanding of the
truth of what occurred. In pleas that involve lies about the facts,
however, the parties ultimately bend or discard facts to reach a
resolution.

51. See, e.g., ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 11; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12; N.H. R. CRIM. P. 11.
52. I use the word “regularly” here because, as the taxonomy demonstrates, the sorts of pleas that are
based on lies are typical and common in practice; however, because these pleas are often done in the
shadows, see supra Part I, it is difficult to calculate the number of pleas that are based on lies. On the issue
of how to normatively characterize these sorts of pleas, scholars have made compelling arguments
that—as to the use of them by prosecutors—at least some of these practices should be prohibited. Jeffrey
Bellin argues that prosecutors should not use fictional pleas to resolve cases, while Darryl Brown makes
the argument that fashioning factually baseless pleas is within the scope of appropriate prosecutorial
discretion but that pleas to non-existent crimes are less justified by traditional conceptions of prosecutorial
discretion. Compare Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1231 (2020)
(noting prosecutors, based on the law, cannot bargain for fictional pleas), with Darryl K. Brown, Factually
Baseless Enforcement of Criminal Law Is Okay. Full Enforcement Is Not., 104 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 515
(2020) (arguing that charging defendants with baseless offenses is a tactic to “moderat[e] the harshness
or inadequacies of criminal law” and that little justification exists for prosecuting nonexistent crimes).
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1. Fictional Pleas
In a previous article, Fictional Pleas, I explored how plea
bargaining provides an avenue for guilty defendants to plead guilty but
to crimes they did not commit. 53 Such guilty pleas involve:
[A] guilty plea, a factual admission of the elements of a
crime [or a plea of nolo contendere,] an “admission of guilt
for the purposes of the case,” entered by a defendant for an
offense that the defendant did not commit, and that all the
parties in the case know the defendant did not commit. 54
There are many examples of these pleas. For instance, Fictional
Pleas begins with an example of a defendant who transformed a single
felony sex offense into three separate misdemeanor sex offenses that
each corresponded to a separate “act.”55 Even though all parties
(including the judge) agreed there was only one criminal act, the three
misdemeanor pleas proceeded.56 In this way, the defendant avoided
sex offender registration and other onerous burdens accompanying a
felony sex offense.57 Plus, the prosecutor still achieved a long sentence
by running three misdemeanor sentences consecutive to one another,
while avoiding the time and expense of a trial. 58 In another jurisdiction,
a defendant was charged with multiple counts of downloading child
pornography, along with possession of criminal tools for his use of the
computer to commit the crime. 59 The defendant ended up pleading
guilty to felonious assault, despite no factual record to support that
charge.60 In many drug cases, defense attorneys work to transform
drug charges into non-drug charges to help defendants avoid

53. See generally Johnson, supra note 44. Others have described these pleas as “baseless pleas.” See
Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2966–67 (2010).
54. Johnson, supra note 44, at 860 (quoting Byrne, supra note 53, at 2966).
55. Id. at 857.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Donnelly, supra note 32, at 431.
60. Id.
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immigration consequences, often through the use of fictional pleas.61
One extreme example out of Washington involved a defendant accused
of a violent robbery, who then pleaded guilty to “creating no less than
one thousand illegal music recordings without consent.”62 As the
public defender admitted during a later interview: “There were no
allegations of sound recordings or videos. We were just being creative
to get to the point we need to get in sentencing.”63
Fictional pleas abound in less serious cases as well. Many drivers
use fictional pleas to escape traffic offenses that would add points to
their license. For instance, a 2007 case in Iowa revealed that in one
county, defendants were regularly pleading down from a variety of
misdemeanor traffic offenses to a nonmoving violation charge of a
“cowl-lamp” violation.64 A “cowl-lamp” is an antique fender lamp no
longer used on modern vehicles, and Iowa law prohibited motor
vehicles from being equipped with more than two side cowl-lamps.65
It is safe to say that hundreds of drivers in Iowa were not equipping
their vehicles with three or more side cowl-lamps.66
Fictional pleas like this allow a defendant to escape some penalty
associated with the crime that he did commit, including immigration
consequences, sex offender registration, a higher charge or sentence,
or points on one’s driver’s license. Prosecutors consent to these pleas
because they benefit from the plea—namely, the certainty of a criminal
conviction67—and they may not have a strong interest in seeing the
defendant suffer the non-criminal penalty. In some instances, the plea
may even politically benefit prosecutors in certain districts where local
voters consider showing mercy through plea bargaining as an asset.68

61. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 858.
62. Jolly & Prescott, supra note 37, at 1086.
63. Id. (quoting Thomas Clouse, Man Pleads Guilty to Bogus Crime, SPOKESMAN-REV. (May 1,
2006),
https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2006/may/01/man-pleads-guilty-to-bogus-crime/
[https://perma.cc/Z5TA-S3A7] (quotation attributed to assistant public defender Tom Krzyminski)).
64. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205, 207, 209 (Iowa 2007).
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. (“Everyone involved, including [the County Attorney], knew the cowl-lamp charges were not
supported by probable cause. In fact, there was no factual basis for the charges at all because vehicles no
longer have cowl or fender lamps.”).
67. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 858.
68. Id. at 875.
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No matter the motivation, the result is a plea that does not reflect, and
sometimes does not even relate to, the underlying factual allegations
that the parties believe to be the truth. And although some states
seemingly prohibit the use of such pleas, 69 for the reasons described in
Part I, plea bargaining is loosely regulated on the ground, making it
unlikely that statutes and court opinions can fully restrict their use by
stakeholders.70
Indeed, lawyers seem increasingly comfortable being open about
their use of fictional pleas, even while rejecting the term. The
Michigan Supreme Court proposed a rule change that would restrict
the procedures around plea bargaining to require that defendants
provide a factual record only to the charges of conviction. 71 As the
69. Brown, supra note 52, at 527–28, 528 nn.57–62 (reviewing the states that “have expressly
condoned factually baseless convictions”).
70. See supra Part I.
71. The current plea procedure rules under Rule 6.302 and Rule 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
reads, in part:
Rule 6.302 Pleas of Guilty and Nolo Contendere
....
(D) An Accurate Plea.
(1) If the defendant pleads guilty, the court, by questioning the defendant,
must establish support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense
charged or the offense to which the defendant is pleading.
....
Rule 6.610 Criminal Procedure Generally
....
(F) Pleas of Guilty and Nolo Contendere. Before accepting a plea of guilty of nolo
contendere, the court shall in all cases comply with this rule.
(1) The court shall determine that the plea is . . . accurate. In determining the
accuracy of the plea,
(a) if the defendant pleads guilty, the court, by questioning the
defendant, shall establish support for a finding that the defendant is
guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which the defendant is
pleading . . . .
MICH. CT. R. 6.302(D)(1) (emphasis added); MICH. CT. R. 6.610(F)(1)(a) (emphasis added). The proposed
rule would have eliminated the italicized language (“the offense charged”) and would have only allowed
a defendant to present a factual record only to the crime for which she was pleading guilty. Proposed
Amendments of Rule 6.302 & Rule 6.610 of the Mich. Ct. Rules, ADM File No. 2018-29, at *2 (Mich.
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court noted, the proposed change was meant to address the use of
“fictional pleas.”72 Both prosecutors and defense attorneys objected to
the proposal, arguing that such a requirement would prevent
defendants from pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit—a tool
that both sides identified as critical to producing just results for
defendants and, interestingly, victims.73 The following are among the
fictional pleas that lawyers said they relied on: pleading a driving while
under the influence case down to a failure to report an accident;74
allowing a defendant to plead to an aggravated assault, even where
there was no factual basis of an injury as required by the statute; using
disorderly conduct—which requires proof of intoxication in a public
place—to resolve a malicious destruction of property charge.75
2. Fact Bargaining
Fact bargaining and its close cousin, charge bargaining, 76 are
perhaps the original forms of lying at plea bargaining. In fact
Mar.
25,
2021)
[hereinafter
Proposed
Michigan
Court
Rule
Amendments],
https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-11-21_PPC_agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JAF5V7WT].
72. Proposed Michigan Court Rule Amendments, ADM File No. 2018-29, at *1.
73. Crim. Juris. & Prac. Comm., State Bar of Mich., Public Policy Position on ADM File No. 2018-29
Proposed
Amendments
of
MCR
6.302
&
6.610,
at
*1
(May
7,
2021),
https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-11-21_PPC_agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WY8SKVRZ]. In the letter from the State Bar of Michigan, the Executive Director wrote:
[The State Bar of Michigan] Board [of Commissioners] voted unanimously to
oppose the rule amendments. These amendments will take away an important tool
in the criminal justice process and reduce the options available when negotiating a
plea, which has the potential to harm the government, defendants, and victims. For
example, a victim may want a defendant to admit to the facts charged [as opposed
to facts that correspond with the conviction], and it not clear why the court rules
should deprive them of that option. The amendments are not only unnecessary but
detrimental to the criminal justice process.
Letter from Janet K. Welch, Exec. Dir., State Bar of Michigan, to Larry Royster, Clerk of the Ct.,
Michigan Sup. Ct. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-1121_PPC_agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY8S-KVRZ].
74. E-mail from Stephen Adams, Att’y-at-L., to ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov (Mar. 31, 2021,
10:18:52
EST),
https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-11-21_PPC_agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WY8S-KVRZ].
75. Letter from Prosecuting Att’ys Ass’n of Michigan, to JJ. of the Michigan Sup. Ct. (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-11-21_PPC_agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WY8SKVRZ].
76. Crespo, supra note 29, at 1311 (“A charge bargain is thus simply an agreement to replace a higher
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bargaining, the defendant and prosecutor agree to certain facts, after
the arrest but often before the indictment, that define the defendant’s
charges. This, in turn, can change the charges. Parties engage in fact
bargaining to achieve some particular outcome vis-à-vis the charges.
For instance, the defendant may have been charged at arrest with
possessing drugs and a gun, but through the process of fact bargaining,
the facts are modified to indicate that the defendant only possessed
drugs; the gun then disappears.77 Or in a statutory rape case, the
prosecutor may agree to stipulate to the fact that the defendant and
victim were a certain number of years apart in age to ensure the
defendant falls under a less serious sexual assault statute, even if that
“fact” is untrue.78 With fact bargaining, the parties reach resolution
over the facts to determine the charges, which means the facts are not
a fixed dataset but rather may be massaged to fit whatever charge the
parties deem fair.
Fact bargaining, like charge bargaining, has been practiced for
decades. For instance, in 1996, a study of federal probation officers
found that a major concern for probation officers was that “plea
agreements commonly fail to reflect the true facts of a case, thus
distorting guideline calculations and mak[ing] it difficult for the court
to consider properly whether to accept a plea agreement.”79
Approximately forty percent of probation officers reported that the
“guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements in a majority of
cases are not ‘supported by offense facts that accurately and
completely reflect all aspects of the case.’”80
And yet, unlike some of the other pleas listed in this taxonomy, fact
bargaining may not seem as obviously a “lie.” After all, it is a
negotiation over the appropriate charges for the defendant, and one
charge with a lower one in exchange for the defendant’s promise to plead guilty, which guarantees the
prosecutor a conviction without the expense of trial.”).
77. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 862–63.
78. Indeed, as Justice Michael Donnelly of the Ohio Supreme Court recounts, as a trial judge, he was
once asked to accept a stipulation that the defendant and victim were three years apart in age, rather than
four years—which was the truth—so the defendant could avoid a felony statutory rape charge. Donnelly,
supra note 32, at 434.
79. David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What They See, 8
FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996).
80. Id.
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way to arrive at those appropriate charges is through mutual agreement
on relevant facts. But a negotiation over facts is a negotiation over
truth—or the degree of truth—and falls somewhere between a
full-blown airing of the facts and a complete lie. For instance, to say a
defendant possessed a small amount of drugs when he actually
possessed a much larger amount of drugs is, to some degree, a lie about
what police found when they arrested the defendant. That lie makes a
difference in what sentence the defendant receives, and this divergence
between punishments makes clear that legislators purposefully
distinguished between two different drug amounts within the law for a
particular reason.81 But fact bargaining allows the parties to maneuver
around the legislative intent. 82 Evidence that legislatures contemplate
such maneuvering83 does not negate the lie at the base of the plea;
rather it only explains the mechanisms that allow for it.
3. Guilty Pleas of Innocent Defendants
After hundreds of overturned convictions and decades of
DNA-based exonerations, there remains little doubt that people plead
guilty to crimes when they are factually innocent of any crime.84 The
Innocence Project highlights the terrible stories of people imprisoned
for years—even decades—for crimes they did not commit but to which
they pleaded guilty.85 Indeed, despite earlier protestations from the
Supreme Court that plea bargaining does not result in the conviction

81. But see Mark Osler & Thea Johnson, Why Not Treat Drug Crimes as White-Collar Crimes?, 61
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015) (arguing that pegging the seriousness of drug crimes to the amount of drugs
at issue does not make sense from a public safety or retributivist perspective).
82. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 862 (“[Fact bargaining] functions as a maneuver around the
law . . . .”).
83. See infra Part III.A (discussing theories that legislators create a range of charge and sentencing
options to give prosecutors leverage during the plea process).
84. See, e.g., Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/exonerate/
[https://perma.cc/AN9K-K89F] (noting DNA testing has exonerated “375 people in the United States”).
85. See Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty to Crimes They Didn’t Commit?,
#GUILTYPLEAPROBLEM,
https://guiltypleaproblem.org/#stats
[https://perma.cc/E9UT-XNRN]
(spotlighting the individual stories of innocent people who pleaded guilty). The Innocence Project and the
Innocence Network created the website #GuiltyPleaProblem.org. Innocence Staff, Guilty Plea Problem
Website Re-Launch Today!, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guiltyplea-problem-website-re-launch-today/ [https://perma.cc/DM5U-JEFD].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/8

24

Johnson: Lying at Plea Bargaining

2022]

LYING AT PLEA BARGAINING

697

of innocent people,86 more recent jurisprudence acknowledges that
innocent people pleading guilty is a risk of plea bargaining. As Justice
Scalia noted in Lafler v. Cooper:
In the United States, we have plea bargaining aplenty,
but . . . it has been regarded as a necessary evil. It
presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that
effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid
massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser
offense . . . .”87
There is no doubt that criminal justice actors know that innocent
people plead guilty to crimes they did not commit. There are a few
ways that such “innocence pleas” manifest themselves as lies. One is
where the defense attorney, who holds the genuine belief that the
defendant is innocent, allows, or even encourages, the defendant to
proceed with the plea, putting a factually inaccurate plea (and
potentially a factually inaccurate statement of facts) on the record. 88
This sort of plea allows the defendant to avoid what would be the
worse outcome after trial, generally a harsher sentence than the one
offered with the plea. There is also anecdotal evidence that judges
allow defendants to plead guilty even when they have reason to believe

86. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970). The Court explained:
We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas
by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised
by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the
contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that
pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by . . . defendants with
adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and
reliability of the defendants’ admissions that they committed the crimes with which
they are charged.
Id.
87. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Indeed, as Abbe Smith has argued, it may be imperative for a defense attorney to facilitate the
guilty plea of an innocent person if it saves the person from an unjust sentence. See ABBE SMITH, CASE
OF A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER’S STORY 40–44 (2008) (describing the defense attorney
dilemma of how hard to lean on an innocent client to take a plea). For the purposes of this Article, I put
the ethical question aside. Whether it is ethical to facilitate such pleas, they are still lies when they are
entered onto the formal record because the defense attorney knows or genuinely believes that the
defendant is not guilty.
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the defendant is innocent to prevent the defendant from receiving a
long sentence after trial. 89
Prosecutors also participate in innocence pleas, often in the form of
Alford pleas (which are also discussed as lies of process in Part
II.c.2).90 In an Alford plea, the defendant accepts a conviction on his
record while openly proclaiming innocence. 91 Effectively, the
defendant says: “I am not guilty, but I agree to take the plea.” There
are several examples of prosecutors using Alford pleas to convict
defendants who the prosecutors may themselves believe are
innocent.92 Perhaps the most famous example is the case of the “West
Memphis Three.”93 In 1993, Damien Echols, Jessie Misskelley, Jr.,
and Jason Baldwin were charged as teenagers with murdering three
eight-year-old boys in Arkansas.94 Despite flimsy evidence, the
defendants were convicted. Echols was sentenced to death, and
Misskelley and Baldwin were sentenced to life in prison.95
Exonerating evidence emerged many years after the convictions.96 As
the courts considered whether the new evidence was grounds for a
retrial, the prosecutor offered the three an Alford plea.97 Despite the
new evidence pointing to their innocence, the defendants accepted the
Alford plea, asserting their innocence, yet acceding that the state had
sufficient evidence to convict them.98 For its part, the prosecution
89. Donnelly, supra note 32, at 431–32 (describing a training session with judges in which half the
judges would have accepted a plea of guilty, even where the defense attorney informed the judge that the
client swears that he is innocent).
90. See infra Part II.C.
91. See infra Part II.C.2.
92. This category excludes instances where there is disagreement about the defendant’s guilt among
the parties. There are many cases where prosecutors and defense attorneys take opposite views of where
the evidence leads. When a prosecutor offers a plea that corresponds with their genuinely held belief about
a defendant’s guilt, even if that belief later turns out to be incorrect, that plea is not based on a lie.
93. John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who
Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 157 (2014).
94. Id. at 158.
95. Id. at 159.
96. This turn of events was due in large part to the work of Joe Berlinger, a filmmaker who focused
his 1996 documentary, Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills, and two later follow-up
films, Paradise Lost 2: Revelations and Paradise Lost 3: Purgatory, on the plight of the three defendants.
PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (Home Box Office 1996); PARADISE LOST
2: REVELATIONS (Home Box Office 2000); PARADISE LOST: PURGATORY (Home Box Office 2012).
97. Blume & Helm, supra note 93, at 160.
98. Shargel, supra note 6.
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claimed to still believe that these defendants were guilty. 99 Their
willingness to allow the defendants to walk out of prison for the
murder of three young boys clearly indicated that the state had no such
certainty. Instead, it used a plea bargain, based on a lie, to allow the
convictions to stand and the defendants to walk free, 100 likely to avoid
a later civil suit. Alford pleas have been similarly used in other cases
where a defendant’s innocence has been established. 101
This use of the Alford plea in this context is a different sort of lie
than the traditional use of such lying during plea bargaining. Instead
of the defendant’s oral claim of innocence performing the lie, it is the
conviction itself which rests on the lie that the factual record supports
a finding of guilt. But the result, like in other innocence pleas, is the
same: a guilty plea based on a lie as a means of resolving a case
involving innocent defendants.
I conclude with a note about the defendant’s role in innocence pleas.
It goes without saying that in innocence pleas, the defendant is also
facilitating the lie. Presumably, the defendant is aware of whether he
committed the crime, and when an innocent person pleads guilty to a
crime he did not commit, he is lying. From a systemic perspective,
these lies tell us much about the pressures that defendants face to plead
guilty. But these lies are different in nature than those told by other
stakeholders, mostly because the defendant is the only one who can be
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Lara Bazelon, Ending Innocence Denying, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 467–68 (2018);
Megan Rose & ProPublica, The Deal Prosecutors Offer When They Have No Cards Left to Play,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/what-does-an-innocentman-have-to-do-to-go-free-plead-guilty/539001/ [https://perma.cc/ZL88-LNEH] (detailing the DNA
exoneration of two men convicted for murder, resulting in one man accepting an Alford plea, while the
other pursued a retrial); Martha Waggoner, North Carolina Man Exonerated by Panel in 1979 Dorm
Slaying, AP NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://apnews.com/93519aca1dfd4b0585e8a0feab93f51c
[https://perma.cc/9JUB-SHSV] (highlighting a mentally ill defendant who entered an Alford plea in 1988
and was exonerated by a judicial panel in 2019, nearly forty years after the murder for which he was
convicted); Sydney Schneider, Comment, When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing the
Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence Movement, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 279, 284–86 (2013) (noting studies by the U.S. Department of Justice
conducted between 2003 and 2004 found that between 6.5% and 8.5% of inmates entered Alford pleas).
Yet another example of a surprisingly common “innocence plea” was identified by JESSICA S. HENRY,
SMOKE BUT NO FIRE: CONVICTING THE INNOCENT OF CRIMES THAT NEVER HAPPENED 4 (2020) (noting
that nearly one-third of exonerations since 1989 involved “no-crime” convictions, in which the defendant
was convicted of a crime that never occurred).
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certain of the truth. The other stakeholders are usually acting on
genuine belief rather than first-hand certainty. Further, what separates
defendants from other stakeholders is that, illogically, defendants tend
to have little to do with the plea process itself. 102 They are often
excluded from negotiations and only play a role at the time of the
colloquy (where, as I note in Section C, the lie formally enters the
record).103 Part III.B explores in greater detail the way these
differences should shape our understanding of lying at plea bargaining,
but it is critical to note that systemically authorized lies by defendants
during the plea process are of a different nature than those told or
approved of by lawyers and judges.104
B. Lies About Law
Although many forms of lying involve manipulations of the law and
facts—for instance, fact bargaining allows the parties to influence
which charges (or laws) apply to the case through the negotiation of
facts—it is generally harder to manipulate the laws. This makes sense;
it is easier to massage the facts to fit a law than to massage the law to
fit the facts. But, as explored below, there is one form of plea
bargaining in which lawyers twist statutes until they no longer actually
represent a true law: pleas to crimes that do not exist.
1. Pleas to Crimes that Do Not Exist
Courts have allowed defendants to plead guilty to crimes that they
could not be convicted of at trial because the crimes do not exist; there
would be no statute on which to instruct the jury and therefore no crime
to charge. Several courts have upheld guilty pleas to non-existent
crimes. For instance, a Kansas court found a defendant could plead to
an attempted second-degree unintentional murder, even though Kansas
does not recognize attempted second-degree unintentional murder as a
crime because “it is logically impossible for a person to have the
102. Thea Johnson, Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133, 139 (2019) (noting
that defendants are excluded from the secretive, off-the-record plea process, even in their own cases).
103. See infra Part II.C.
104. See infra Part III.B.
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specific intent to commit an unintentional killing.”105 The court
reasoned:
Although the practice of permitting plea agreements such as
this one to stand may seem illogical at first glance, such
agreements serve a legitimate purpose. Compromises have
long been permitted by our courts. Criminal cases are
resolved by plea bargains virtually every day. As long as due
process requirements are met and the bargain is beneficial to
the defendant that defendant cannot later validly collaterally
attack either the plea or bargained-for sentence.106
An Ohio court came to a similar conclusion: if the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and received a benefit, then
he could plead to the non-existent crime of attempted involuntary
manslaughter.107 Courts have not, however, allowed a defendant’s
conviction of a non-existent crime after trial.108 Rather, it is only
through plea bargaining that a defendant can secure a conviction to a
non-existent crime. One can find several more examples of pleas to
crimes that do not exist in other jurisdictions.109
105. McPherson v. State, 163 P.3d 1257, 1261, 1264 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
106. Id. at 1264 (relying on the holding in Spencer v. State, 942 P.2d 646, 647, 649 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997), aff’d, 954 P.2d 1088 (Kan. 1998), which found that a defendant who was charged with a valid
crime, aggravated battery, “may, pursuant to a beneficial plea agreement knowingly entered, plead guilty
to [the] nonexistent crime” of attempted aggravated assault).
107. State v. Wickham, No. CA 76-40, 1977 Ohio App. LEXIS 10210, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28,
1977).
108. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (N.Y. 1993) (“While we will allow a defendant
to plead to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of an indictment charging a crime with a heavier
penalty, . . . [f]or a conviction, a jury must find the defendant guilty of each element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt, but could not do so here because an element of attempted manslaughter in the first
degree as charged is an unintended result that as a matter of law cannot be attempted.” (citations omitted)).
109. State v. Pollman, 441 P.3d 511, 517 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a defendant’s prior
conviction for a non-existent crime is still a conviction for the purposes of calculating the defendant’s
criminal history at sentencing), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 118672 (Kan. Mar. 23, 2021),
https://pittsreporting.kscourts.org/Appellate/CaseDetails?caseNumber=118672 [https://perma.cc/M6FKMV5L]; People v. Myrieckes, 734 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that the defendant may
enter plea to a non-existent crime); People v. Guishard, 789 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Div. 2005)
(affirming conviction to legally impossible attempted assault in the first degree); People v. Genes, 227
N.W.2d 241, 242–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming an attempted manslaughter conviction achieved
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The critic may decry the description of these pleas as lies. After all,
anyone can go to the statute book and discover that there is no such
crime as an attempted unintentional murder. Despite this, I
characterize pleas to crimes that do not exist as lies for several reasons.
First, like the fictional pleas described above, these lies are not an
accurate reflection of the defendant’s conduct. If it is indeed
impossible to attempt an unintentional crime, then a defendant’s
confession of guilt to such a crime is impossible as well, making it a
lie to make such a claim. Second, all actors involved in the plea agree
that the plea does not represent the charged criminal conduct, so there
is a knowing acceptance of the lie among the stakeholders. Third, it is
not always clear to the outside world that the plea represents an
impossibility. Although a lawyer may determine that the defendant
could not be convicted of the same conduct at trial, such a conclusion
may fall outside the purview of any non-criminal justice actors looking
at the plea. Nonetheless, the conviction attaches to the defendant’s
record, becoming a part of the defendant’s criminal history.
C. Lies About Process
Finally, this taxonomy identifies lies about process. Lies about
process are critical to the functioning of the criminal system; they are
the grease that keep the wheels turning. Indeed, as I describe below,
these lies about process facilitate the formal acceptance of the guilty
plea, while shielding from view the realities of how and why
defendants decide to plead guilty. They give the process legitimacy
while maintaining the lack of transparency that is a key characteristic
of the plea process.
1. The Plea Colloquy
Once a defendant is ready to plead guilty, they must enter a plea on
the record and engage in a plea colloquy with the judge. 110 That
through a guilty plea, even though under Michigan law “there can be no such thing as attempted
involuntary manslaughter” because the “factual basis may support a finding that the defendant is guilty of
either the crime charged or the crime pled to”).
110. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
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colloquy is necessary because the judge has the duty to establish that
the defendant is waiving their rights knowingly and voluntarily.111 The
judge does this by asking a series of questions about the defendant’s
decision to plead guilty and their knowledge of their rights.112
But to meet the constitutional standard, defendants often lie during
these colloquies. These lies are done with the knowledge and approval
of the other actors in the courtroom, including the judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney. In fact, such lies are encouraged so that pleas can
be recorded quickly and in accordance with statutory and
constitutional mandates. But defendants, despite what they say on the
record, often do not enter plea bargains knowingly or voluntarily.
For instance, to plead guilty “knowingly,” the Supreme Court has
held that defendants should be advised by competent counsel and made
aware of the nature of the charges against them. 113 But defendants
frequently plead guilty early in the case, often at their first appearance,
before they have had a chance to review discovery or consult with
counsel.114 Further, millions of misdemeanor defendants across the
country plead guilty without any counsel at all. 115 To get the benefit of
the plea, those defendants are required to affirm that they understand
a panoply of rights that they are giving up 116 without having a single
conversation with a lawyer. Even defendants with a lawyer often do
not understand the collateral consequences of pleading guilty or
sometimes even the direct consequences. Yet the guilty plea hinges on
the lie—told every day in courts across the country—that the
defendant understands the nature and consequences of the charges.
The same issues come up with establishing the voluntariness of the
plea. A voluntary plea is one in which the defendant’s plea is not

111. See supra Part I.
112. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
113. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970).
114. See generally Colin Miller, The Right to Evidence of Innocence Before Pleading Guilty, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2019) (arguing for an explicit right to Brady material pre-plea).
115. See generally S IXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MAINE: EVALUATION OF
SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE MAINE COMMISSION ON INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES (2019),
https://sixthamendment.org/6AC/6AC_me_report_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AY2-7728] (discussing
the lack of assigned counsel in misdemeanor cases across the state).
116. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
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“induced by threats” and improper promises.117 The plea colloquy in
every jurisdiction requires the court to ask the defendant on the record
if they were promised anything in exchange for pleading guilty to
assess whether such threats or improper promises are the heart of the
agreement.118 The “right” answer to that question is “no” because such
promises might undermine the “voluntariness” of the plea. Instead,
courts maintain the fiction that defendants only plead guilty in
exchange for the promised sentence and charge laid out on the
record.119 But, of course, defendants are promised all sorts of things,
formally and informally, to induce their guilty pleas. These promises
cannot, however, be acknowledged on the record if the plea is to stand
constitutional muster.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s guilty plea
was not involuntary when the government promised to drop charges
against his son in exchange for his guilty plea.120 But had the defendant
claimed that he was pleading guilty only to protect his son as he later
did on appeal,121the trial court would have likely rejected his plea, even
though the government held out his son’s prosecution as its main
inducement for him to take the plea. Acknowledging that he was
pleading to save his son would not have been the “correct” answer,
even though it was the truthful answer. In the same vein, a defendant
generally cannot admit that they are pleading guilty to sidestep
immigration consequences, reduce their sentence, or for any of the
other reasons defendants regularly plead guilty. Although some courts
may allow the defendant to give their true reasons for accepting a

117. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)
(en banc), rev’d on other grounds per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
119. Id.; United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that if the plea is the
“product of prosecutorial ‘threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises,’” then the defendant can
challenge it as not knowing and voluntary under Brady (first quoting Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d
1083, 1086 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981); and then citing Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284, 285 (10th
Cir. 1968)).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Seng Chen Yong, 926 F.3d 582, 585–86 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that,
as long as there was probable cause to prosecute a defendant’s child, a defendant’s guilty plea was not
involuntary if it was induced by his desire to avoid prosecution for his child).
121. Id. at 585.
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plea,122 many others require the defendant to stick to a circumscribed
script at the colloquy.
The following is how one judge described the process:
[I]f the judge makes a sentencing commitment in
chambers, it is an unspoken rule in some courtrooms
that such a commitment is not to be communicated
publicly, especially at the plea hearing. Therefore,
defense counsel must often privately instruct [the]
client to unequivocally answer “no” when asked at the
hearing if any promises have been made to induce the
plea[.]
Occasionally in the courtrooms where this occurs, a
defendant will forget this important instruction from
the attorney and state at the plea hearing something to
the effect . . . : “Yes, my attorney told me I would
receive a minimum sentence.” There are scores of
transcripts where something like this has occurred. The
embarrassed defense attorney will then [ask to speak to
their client off the record] [a]nd then miraculously the
client will resume back on the record, “No[,] your
honor, no promises have been made to me.”123
The excerpt above makes explicit the common understanding
among stakeholders that a defendant’s “correct” answers to the plea
colloquy’s queries are not necessarily accurate answers.
The colloquy may seem like a classic legal fiction—a bit of oil to
keep to the wheels of justice churning. But true legal fictions are
acknowledged as such; future courts understand that when we say a
corporation is a person, the corporation does not, in fact, breathe air.
Pleas of guilty, on the other hand, receive the imprimatur of truth.
When the defendant says they are pleading guilty because they are
122. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Alford case).
123. Donnelly, supra note 32, at 428.
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guilty and not through any promises or inducements, future courts hold
that against them.124 In fact, the high-profile case of Michael Flynn,
the once National Security Advisor to former President Donald Trump,
makes this clear. Flynn pleaded guilty on the record and then claimed,
after his plea, that the government induced his plea by a series of
inappropriate threats, including that they would charge his son with a
crime if he did not plead guilty.125 Flynn pleaded guilty and then later
attempted to withdraw his plea. 126 Former U.S. Attorney General
William Barr supported Flynn and told CBS News of the case, that
“people sometimes plead to things that turn out not to be crimes.”127 A
retired judge, appointed by the district court to review the case,
recommended a perjury charge for Flynn’s attempts to withdraw his
plea.128 Yet the threat of the perjury charge by the district court makes
clear that courts view the act of taking the plea as the truth. This means
that the plea colloquy has the force of truth, even though it is quite
often, at the moment of its inception, a lie.
2. Alford Pleas
As described above, in an Alford plea, a defendant declares his
innocence at the time of the plea while also accepting a conviction and
any associated punishment. 129 A court accepts the defendant’s claims
124. For instance, rules that allow for impeachment by prior conviction do not differentiate between
convictions that were the result of plea bargains based on lies and those that were not. FED. R. EVID. 613.
125. Quinta Jurecic & Benjamin Wittes, Flynn Redux: What Those FBI Documents Really Show,
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020, 3:32 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/flynn-redux-what-those-fbidocuments-really-show [https://perma.cc/8YUN-WCNX] (detailing documentary evidence that Flynn
claims proved the government inappropriately threatened to prosecute his son for activities related to
Flynn’s consulting work for the Turkish government). But see Spencer S. Hsu & Ann E. Marimow, Flynn
Committed Perjury, and DOJ Request to Toss His Conviction Was ‘Corrupt,’ ‘Politically Motivated,’
Court-Appointed
Adviser
Argues,
WASH.
POST
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/michael-flynn-committed-perjury-but-should-notface-contempt-hearing-court-appointed-counsel-finds/2020/06/10/09dada24-aa81-11ea-9063e69bd6520940_story.html [https://perma.cc/T9B7-4M8J] (highlighting Flynn’s many shifting reasons for
withdrawing his guilty plea).
126. Attorney General Barr Says What Michael Flynn Did “Was Not a Crime,” CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-flynn-case-dismissal-william-barr-attorney-general/
[https://perma.cc/S455-KRBW] (May 8, 2020, 3:48 PM).
127. Id. (quoting former U.S. Attorney General William Barr).
128. Hsu & Marimow, supra note 125.
129. See supra Part II.A.3.
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of innocence only if the court is satisfied that the defendant is actually
guilty, despite holding no trial or meaningfully testing the evidence.
And this is the lie about process—namely, the court makes a finding
of guilt, even though, in most cases, they only heard a mere recitation
of facts from the prosecutor.
To understand how an Alford plea functions, we must briefly review
the Alford case itself. In Alford, the defendant was charged with the
capital offense of first-degree murder.130 Before accepting a plea, the
trial court heard sworn testimony from both sides. 131 The prosecution
presented an officer, who gave a summary of the evidence. 132 The
defense put on Alford himself, who testified under oath that he had not
committed the murder, but to avoid the death penalty, he would plead
guilty to the reduced charge of second-degree murder.133 Relying on
its prior jurisprudence involving nolo contendere pleas,134 the Court
upheld Alford’s plea of guilty:
Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of
trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is
not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal
penalty. An individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of
a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime.135
And so, the Alford plea was born. In a footnote, Justice White
affirmed that Alford pleas were only acceptable in cases where guilt
was established:
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of
130. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1970).
131. Id. at 28.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 28 & n.2.
134. The Court in Alford described nolo contendere pleas in the following way: “[A] plea by which a
defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the
court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.” Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 37.
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[e]nsuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and
intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions
properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence
should not be accepted unless there is [some] factual basis
for the plea, and until the judge taking the plea has inquired
into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of
trial and the claim of innocence. 136
But the standard for a factual basis fails to rise to the level of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed, there is no clear standard, except
that the judge be convinced the defendant is guilty, even when the
defendant swears under oath—as in Alford—that he is not.137
Furthermore, the Supreme Court provides no guidance to trial courts
on how developed a factual record must be to accept an Alford plea.
One might imagine that, given that a factual record is not required,
Alford pleas would be used only for low-level crimes when,
presumably, the stakes are low, and the factual record is simple. But
interestingly, Alford pleas are frequently used to resolve cases
involving violent crimes. One study estimated that, from 2003 to 2004,
76,000 individuals entered Alford pleas and that 50% of defendants
who took an Alford plea were incarcerated for violent crimes such as
murder, assault, and sexual assault. 138 Twenty-five percent were
incarcerated for property crimes, 20% for drug crimes, and only about

136. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10 (citations omitted).
137. Of course, another lie embedded in the Alford case is that if indeed the court is truly convinced of
the defendant’s guilt, it still allows the defendant to then lie in open court that he did not commit the crime.
As such, the defendant does not have to confront the harm he has caused. Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking
Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006) (“A sincere confession . . . can be indicative of a wrongdoer’s rehabilitative
potential and can serve as an important first step toward his restoration and reintegration into society.”);
Gad Czudner & Ruth Mueller, The Role of Guilt and Its Implication in the Treatment of Criminals, 31
INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 71, 73–74 (1987). In addition, as Stephanos
Bibas has noted, these sorts of pleas send confusing messages about the criminal system’s commitment
to truth: “Guilty-but-not-guilty pleas muddy the moral message by implying that the law does not care
enough to insist on clear, honest resolutions and vindications.” Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing
Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere
Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1402–03 (2003).
138. Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdoğru, Alford Pleas in the Age of Innocence, 27 BEHAV. SCIS. &
L. 467, 484 (2009).
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4% for public-order crimes.139 These numbers indicate that Alford
pleas are not reserved for minor or non-serious crimes. Instead, courts
regularly resolve serious, violent cases with pleas in which the
defendant swears innocence and no meaningful adjudicatory process
was undertaken to get to the truth of what happened.
III. THE PARADOX OF PLEA BARGAINING
The taxonomy above lays the groundwork for exploring the paradox
of plea bargaining. Each form of lying at plea bargaining described in
this Article has a beneficial purpose. These lies allow criminal justice
stakeholders to maneuver around the cascade of conflicting and
cumulative criminal laws, sentences, and collateral consequences that
legislatures have imposed over decades. In many instances, the lack of
transparency in the plea process, along with the flexibility to bend the
truth, benefit stakeholders who want to negotiate just resolutions in
individual cases.
These same virtues, however, also obscure the system from public
view, which has negative consequences more broadly for the criminal
legal system. An examination of lying at plea bargaining quickly
reveals how completely unknowable the system is to an outsider. Even
legislators cannot understand whether the laws they pass function as
designed
because,
in
application,
the
laws
are
manipulated—sometimes beyond recognition—as in the case of pleas
to crimes that do not exist. This means the public at large and those
interested in criminal justice reform do not—indeed, cannot—have a
real grasp on the pressure points in the system because such pressure
is relieved via plea bargaining.
The natural solution to the systemic problem—to make the system
more transparent or less flexible—would likely harm individual
defendants. If lying at plea bargaining disappeared tomorrow,
thousands of defendants would suffer dire consequences, such as
deportation for minor charges or a forced trial rather than a mandatory
minimum sentence. These defendants would lose their ability to avoid
139. Schneider, supra note 101, at 285 (citing Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 138).
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the injustices of the system. Yet lying at plea bargaining is the result
of a series of interlocking mandatory laws and rules that many
stakeholders believe are deeply unfair and should be reformed. Thus,
lying at plea bargaining is both a means of avoiding injustice and a
force prohibiting meaningful reformation of the laws and rules that
produce such injustice.
As the final Section of this Part explores, examining the push and
pull between transparency and flexibility, and between the individual
and the system, reveals a reformer’s dilemma—one that is playing out
in real time in jurisdictions across the country. Should a reformer fight
for more transparency and less flexibility to prevent the many
perversions currently seen in the plea process, or would any changes
to the plea process just make it harder to achieve actual justice?
A. The Benefits of Lying in Individual Cases
Plea bargaining produces several benefits, including significant
efficiency gains in an often overwhelmed system. Lying at plea
bargaining achieves these same gains but adds an additional benefit:
the ability to avoid the many mandatory consequences of the current
laws. Lying allows the parties to achieve outcomes that would be
unachievable by the operation of law because lying expands the range
of options (or outputs) beyond what the inputs determine. For example,
if the parties lie at plea bargaining, the defendant may plead to an
assault rather than a sex offense, thereby changing the output. Thus,
the defendant avoids mandatory sex offender registration by
circumventing the statute on point for his actual conduct.
Similar benefits are found in pleas to statutes that do not exist. At
arrest, the defendant is charged with conduct covered by a statute with
a fixed sentencing scheme and potential collateral consequences;
however, if the defendant pleads to a non-existent statute, the parties
themselves determine the sentence and collateral consequences, with
no logical or foreseeable correlation to the legal inputs.
Also, pleas of process allow parties to achieve outcomes they could
not achieve without lies. For instance, the colloquy is necessary
because of the constitutional requirement that a plea be knowing and
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voluntary.140 To avoid acknowledging the reality that nearly all pleas
are induced by threats and promises, the law asks the parties at the
colloquy to lie about the nature of the bargain. In this way, the benefit
accrued to the parties is the avoidance of a constitutional requirement.
And that is the point: lying in plea bargaining is, at its heart,
avoidance. The lies described in the taxonomy allow stakeholders to
work around the increasing size and scope of the criminal system. Over
the last fifty years, the American system of criminal law has become
much more complex and complicated.141 As Bill Stuntz noted in his
work, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, the breadth and
depth of U.S. criminal justice has expanded dramatically. 142 For
instance, in the early twentieth century, the number of federal laws was
in the dozens.143 Today, there are over four thousand federal criminal
laws.144 On a drug case, sentences range from no jail time to lifetime
incarceration, and those sentences may be enhanced for several
reasons, including if the defendant has a prior conviction from within
the last ten years.145 In addition to these sentencing ranges, the federal
government and local state governments now impose hundreds of
collateral consequences on nearly all drug offenses. 146 Navigating such
140. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (finding reversible error where trial judge
accepted defendant’s guilty plea “without an affirmative showing that [the plea] was intelligent and
voluntary”).
141. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
715, 729 (2013) (“According to the ABA, more than forty percent of the federal criminal laws enacted
since the Civil War have gone on the books since 1970. The number of federal criminal statutes was
one-third larger in 2004 than it was in 1980.” (footnote omitted)).
142. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 513–15
(2001).
143. Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1606 (2012).
144. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws,
WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920 [https://perma.cc/UT8N-NEV5] (describing the
difficulty in accurately counting the number of federal crimes and estimating the total at over three
thousand based on an estimate made by the Justice Department in the 1980s); John S. Baker, Jr.,
Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 545, 548 (2005).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B).
146. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (connecting the increase of collateral
consequences with the get tough on crime approach of the 1980s and 1990s); Nora V. Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999).
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an expansive and complex system of outputs requires flexibility and
responsiveness in the input, which lying provides.
The increase in crimes, criminal punishments, and civil
consequences means that the criminal system has a massive number of
inputs, which grow with each passing year. Even recent criminal
justice reforms—such as the various federal and state clemency
initiatives,147 the Federal First Step Act, 148 and the reforms of recent
local progressive prosecutors 149—tend to focus on how to restrict the
enforcement or effect of the current laws rather than how to decrease
the number of laws. These efforts attempt to chip away at the breadth
and depth of the system in discrete ways but do little to truly reduce
the size of the system.
So, the parties in the criminal system are left with many mandatory
outcomes they wish to avoid for a variety of reasons, including that
147. Jamie Fellner, Presidential Clemency Highlights Need to Fix Bad Laws, HILL (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:00
AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/264942-presidential-clemency-highlights-need-tofix-bad-laws [https://perma.cc/3ML9-L5FE].
148. See, e.g., John Wagner, Trump Signs Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill amid Partisan Rancor over
Stopgap
Spending
Measure,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-sign-bipartisan-criminal-justice-bill-amid-partisanrancor-over-stopgap-spending-measure/2018/12/21/234f9ffc-0510-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html
[https://perma.cc/M2HE-2UCD]; German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/18/18140973/state-of-the-union-trump-first-step-actcriminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/6QFT-JXCT] (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM); Nicholas Fandos, Senate
Passes
Bipartisan
Criminal
Justice
Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/497B-E5DW].
149. Josie Duffy Rice, Opinion, Cyrus Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html
[https://perma.cc/RX9L-G4FH]; see also Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV.
L. REV. 748, 750 (2018). For instance, in Boston, the progressive prosecutor, Rachael Rollins, committed
to not prosecuting the following crimes: trespassing, shoplifting, larceny under $250, disorderly conduct,
disturbing the peace, receiving stolen property, minor driving offenses, breaking and entering, wanton or
malicious destruction of property, threats (excluding domestic violence), minor in possession of alcohol,
drug possession, drug possession with intent to distribute, a stand-alone resisting arrest charge, or a
resisting arrest charge combined only with another charge on the list of charges the office will decline to
prosecute. Charges to Be Declined, RACHAEL ROLLINS, https://rollins4da.com/policy/charges-to-bedeclined/ [https://perma.cc/3KFD-ZWHS]. But according to reports from watchdog groups, these
offenses were charged, albeit punished in different ways. Eoin Higgins, Progressive DA Rachael Rollins
Hasn’t Stopped Prosecuting Petty Crimes, Despite Pledge. Police Are Still Furious., INTERCEPT (Mar.
24,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/24/rachael-rollins-da-petty-crime/
[https://perma.cc/VN4V-XFGW]. Yet a pledge to decline to prosecute certain offenses is a different sort
of promise than working to get those statutes taken off the books. Leaving the vast web of criminal laws
and collateral consequences formally intact in legislation means that prosecution of these charges can be
resumed at any time at the discretion of the DA.
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they believe those outcomes to be unfair or inefficient. As Julia
Simon-Kerr notes about systemic lying in the legal system, 150 lying is
a way for legal actors to “recalibrate the system when formal change
is not forthcoming[, t]hus . . . alert[ing] us to the existence of a strong
and collective dissonance between moral beliefs and legal
prescriptions.”151 In other words, lying makes it possible to change the
outcome of the system without changing the fundamentals of the
system.
Similarly, lying helps maintain a symbiotic relationship between
prosecutors and local legislatures. Prosecutors are accustomed to
tremendous discretion in how they carry out their duties. Legislatures
intend to give prosecutors discretion in the administration of the
criminal law.152 Prosecutors have a huge range of options to draw from
when deciding how to charge a defendant, and they usually have
several statutes that could apply to any particular case, as well as
sentencing enhancements and other tools to ratchet a sentence up or
down. Lying at plea bargaining, however, indicates that the many
sources of law and procedure that govern the criminal system both
empower and constrain prosecutors, and the use of lies demonstrates
this unusual juxtaposition. On the one hand, prosecutors turn to lying
because something in the law constrains them from achieving a
particular outcome. On the other hand, they feel confident about their
ability to lie because they are so accustomed to using their discretion
to get the outcomes they want.
Thus, lying benefits prosecutors by allowing them to avoid
mandatory outcomes, either in the interests of justice or not, while also
150. Early in her article, Systemic Lying, Julia Simon-Kerr gives many examples of such lying:
An English jury finds that the theft of a pair of pants constitutes manslaughter. A
wife accuses her husband of adultery to obtain a divorce, and he goes along with it,
even though they both know this is a lie. A southern jury acquits a [W]hite man of
violence against a [B]lack man, despite clear evidence that the man is guilty. A
police officer says he saw a man holding drugs in plain view, even though the drugs
were concealed and were found in a search without probable cause. What do all
these cases have in common? They are all examples of “systemic lies”: lies that
participants in the legal system tell repeatedly, knowing they are lies and with the
complicity of all participants, for what they see as a higher purpose.
Simon-Kerr, supra note 5, at 2178.
151. Id. at 2179.
152. Stuntz, supra note 142, at 528, 547.
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not pushing back on legislatures—the grantors of their power. Rather
than fight the mandatory nature of registration or simply apply the law
as is, prosecutors use lying in plea bargaining on a case-by-case basis
to avoid certain consequences for individual defendants. In this sense,
lying at plea bargaining helps avoid friction between legislatures and
prosecutors, both of which continue to benefit from a broad criminal
system without having to acknowledge the realities that the system
should produce.
B. The Drawbacks of Lying to the System
The benefits to individual defendants (and to prosecutors in
individual cases) described above comes at a cost to the broader
criminal legal system. The lack of transparency in the criminal system
means there is a mismatch between the system’s inputs (the criminal
laws and procedures applicable to a defendant’s criminal conduct) and
its outputs (the convictions and attendant punishments a defendant
receives). A combination of inputs should produce certain outputs.
After all, in any given jurisdiction, it is clear which criminal statutes
and associated sentencing schemes are available, even if, as I note in
Part I,153 the criminal procedure may vary significantly between
jurisdictions. It is also clear which state and federal collateral
consequences and other non-criminal penalties, such as immigration
consequences, mandatorily attach to a particular criminal
conviction.154 Thus, although these are just some of the inputs that go
into a plea bargain,155 one would expect these inputs, when combined
153. See supra Part I.
154. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 n.15 (2010) (listing state criminal procedure rules that
require trial courts to advise defendants of possible immigration consequences).
155. Of course, there are many non-legal factors that go into plea bargaining outcomes, including the
race and gender of the defendant. See generally Carlos Berdejó, Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining,
94 IND. L.J. 1247 (2019) (discussing how female defendants are more likely than male defendants to have
their charges dropped or reduced); Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Gender Differences in Informal
Processing: A Look at Charge Bargaining and Sentence Reduction in Washington, D.C., 22 J. RSCH.
CRIME & DELINQ. 101 (1985) (discussing how prosecutors may change their criteria in charge bargaining
and sentence reduction based on defendants’ gender); Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Effects
of Gender on Charge Reduction, 25 SOCIO. Q. 385 (1984) (analyzing data and finding no correlation
between gender and charge-reduction measures); Alexander Testa & Brian D. Johnson, Paying the Trial
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in a particular way, to produce a specific output. But they simply do
not.
For instance, an adult defendant charged with a felony sex crime
should face only a certain set of possible outcomes. The sentence will
be defined by the law. There will almost certainly be sex offender
registration attached. The defendant will have to pay the fines and fees
associated with the charge. Although there may be room for
negotiation around the edges, the law—in theory—demands a set of
outcomes; however, lying allows the stakeholders to manipulate these
inputs in ways hidden from public view, warping them until one cannot
even predict the output of a felony sex crime. And by hiding these
realities from view, lying inhibits the feedback loop that would allow
those outside the criminal system to understand what occurs within the
system. It does this by, on the macro-level, making it impossible to
collect meaningful data for systemic review and on the micro-level,
obscuring the stories of individual defendants that might shape the
narrative around reform. In the end, lying at plea bargaining distorts
our view of how and why the criminal system punishes individuals
because lying alters the fundamental input mechanics of the system
while also concealing the alterations themselves.
To illustrate, let us continue examining the felony sex crime
example. In the last few decades, every state and the federal system
has adopted a sex offender registry. 156 In most places, sex offender
registration is now mandatory for felony sex offenses and many
misdemeanor sex offenses.157 Efforts to overturn these mandatory and
Tax: Race, Guilty Pleas, and Disparity in Prosecution, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 500 (2019) (finding
Black and Latino defendants are less likely to plead guilty than White defendants); BESIKI KUTATELADZE,
VANESSA LYNN & EDWARD LIANG, VERA INST. OF JUST., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN
PROSECUTION?:
A
REVIEW
OF
EMPIRICAL
STUDIES
(2012),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/do-race-and-ethnicity-matter-in-prosecution-a-review-ofempirical-studies/legacy_downloads/race-and-ethnicity-in-prosecution-first-edition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VBM-RRWQ] (analyzing studies on how prosecutorial discretion affects racial
disparities).
156. See generally NIC/WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE, FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF
ADULT
SEX
OFFENDER
REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS,
https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/fiftystatesurveyofadultsexoffenderregistrat
ionstatutesnovember2010update.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCC8-S8QT] (Nov. 2010) (providing a
state-by-state list of requirements for sex offender registration).
157. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

43

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 8

716

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

harsh consequences have been largely unsuccessful.158 As a result,
when prosecutors choose to charge sex offenses, they also put the
defendant at risk for the onerous burden of registration159 and often of
some potential mandatory sentence.
But what happens when prosecutors, defense attorneys, or even
judges do not believe these penalties are appropriate, despite the
defendant having been correctly charged—given the factual
allegations—with a sex offense? As we saw in Part II.A, in these
instances, stakeholders use fictional pleas to resolve non-registrable
felony convictions, or they rely on fact bargaining to avoid sex
offender registration or mandatory minimums.160 The stakeholders
themselves decide the just resolution in the case, and this resolution
only comes about through lying because law otherwise formally
prohibits it. As such, by resolving individual cases with such pleas,
legislatures and the public are denied an opportunity to examine how
the sex offender laws are working because they lack reliable data about
what conduct criminal law covers and miss the stories of those
escaping mandatory punishments through the use of lying at plea
bargaining.
These lies should alter how we think about the use of convictions as
markers of guilt. After all, these lies distort efforts to study the criminal
justice system through data. The federal government, states, and cities
rely on data to drive criminal justice policy, legislation, and reform. 161
158. Sarah Lustbader, What Is the Purpose of Sex Offense Registries?, APPEAL (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/what-is-the-purpose-of-sex-offense-registries/
[https://perma.cc/5PC9-QN7P]
(noting that Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers vetoed a bipartisan bill that would have loosened restrictions
on convicted sex offenders).
159. Johnson, supra note 44, at 888–89 (listing the requirements and negative consequences for
defendants of sex offender registration).
160. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
161. See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1490 (2018); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 537, 551 (2015); Ronald L. Davis, Roy L. Austin, Jr. & DJ Patil, Growing Number of
Communities Are Using Data to Improve Policing and Criminal Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES:
OFF. PUB. AFFS., https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/growing-number-communities-are-usingdata-improve-policing-and-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/7YT5-LEDQ] (Mar. 3, 2017). For specific
examples of how data has driven reform processes in states and localities, see Angie Jackson, 18 Ways
Michigan
Could
Change
Its
Criminal
Justice
Process,
DET.
FREE
PRESS,
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/
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Most conviction data is the result of plea bargains because most
convictions are the result of plea bargains. Lying at plea bargaining
calls into question the endeavor to study the criminal justice system
more systemically because so many of the measurables may be
inaccurate. Again, if plea bargaining transforms sex offenses into
non-sex offenses that do not represent the truth of what the defendant
did or did not do, then attempts to use those convictions to measure
either crime or criminal justice outcomes are deeply problematic.
Furthermore, although some stories about defendants shine a light
on the troubles with sex offender registration,162 lying at plea
bargaining indicates that many more defendants are diverted from
registration through pleas based on lies. Without knowing the
intricacies of these lies, the public cannot understand how or why those
defendants benefited from a fictional plea rather than a plea that
requires registration. If there are sympathetic stories (or unsympathetic
stories as in the recent Jeffrey Epstein case)163 that make sex offender
registration not optimal for an individual defendant, the public and
policymakers should hear those stories to better understand whether
sex offender registration is working as intended. Otherwise, by using
lies to avoid sex offender registration, stakeholders deny policymakers

01/14/michigan-jail-reform-criminal-justice/4434827002/ [https://perma.cc/4GPX-996P] (Jan. 14, 2020,
6:04 PM), in Michigan; Andy Sher, Lee’s Criminal Justice Investment Task Force Releases Policy
Recommendations for Public Safety, Inmate Treatment and More, Chattanooga Times Free Press (Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2019/dec/19/lee-criminal-justiceinvestment-task-force-policy-recommendations/511024/ [https://perma.cc/8PWT-J5PT], in Tennessee;
Grace Toohey, Louisiana Sees Rise in Savings, Further Drop in Prison Population from 2nd Year of
Justice
Reforms,
ADVOCATE
(July
19,
2019,
5:20
PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/newscrime_police/article_7759e8a6-aa73-11e9-ad85470066e75115.html [https://perma.cc/R7K7-LU8L], in Louisiana; and Josh Salman, Criminal Justice Bill
‘a Game-Changer,’ HERALD-TRIB., https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180222/a-game-changerflorida-house-passes-criminal-justice-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/RED7-W23E] (Feb. 22, 2018, 7:25
PM), in Florida.
162. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 4 (detailing the stories of individuals on sex offender registries for
sexual conduct they engaged in while teens or pre-teens); Mona Charen, Remove Children from
Sex-Offender Registries, NAT’L REV. (May 31, 2019, 6:30 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/05/sex-offender-registries-children-1994-crime-bill/
[https://perma.cc/W7ZM-ALFF] (“Sex-offender registries in many states make no distinction between
crimes committed by adults against children and offenses children commit against one another. Children
as young as eight years old have been required to register as sex offenders and remain on the registry for
life.”).
163. See Who Was Jeffrey Epstein? The Financier Charged with Sex Trafficking, supra note 4.
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the recorded data points needed to determine the effectiveness of their
policies.
C. The Paradox of Reform
This Article presupposes that the criminal justice system needs
reform. The fact that attorneys, and sometimes judges, allow lying in
plea bargaining provides proof for this contention. For decades, there
have been difficult, robust conversations about how best to tackle this
reform. Like many law reform debates, there are questions of scope
and depth.164
In the following Section, I lay out a reformer’s dilemma that focuses
on two voices in the reform space today: one that calls for more
transparency and accountability at plea bargaining and one that resists
such changes until there can be meaningful transformation of the
broader system. These are the sorts of reform debates among legal
stakeholders about how to improve plea bargaining and, by extension,
the criminal legal system. In Ohio, for instance, defense attorneys
fought a move to require that a factual record be developed and put on
the record at plea bargaining.165 The call for such a rule was to curb
lying and other forms of manipulation at plea bargaining.166 But as the
Ohio State Public Defender argued in his response to the proposal,
lawyers need flexibility to mitigate the draconian laws under which
they operate.167 Being forced to develop an accurate factual record
would inhibit that flexibility and hurt real defendants.168 The argument
goes that until some more transformative reform is in place,
transparency serves as a harm as much as a benefit. This argument was
echoed in the response to the proposed rule change in Michigan

164. Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880, 1887–88
(1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980)).
165. See Donnelly, supra note 32, at 432–33.
166. Id. at 433.
167. Id.
168. Interestingly, prosecutors remained silent on the issue, not taking the opportunity to embrace a
rule requiring more transparency. Id.
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discussed in Part II.A.169 Scholars have documented this push and pull
in other areas of the law as well. 170
Because lying at plea bargaining is the ultimate illustration of the
push and pull between transparency and flexibility, it provides a case
study for this reformer’s dilemma. As the prior two Sections of this
Part lay out, lying produces both profound benefits and harms.171 If
you want a more just process and better outcomes—what should a
reformer do?
Before getting into the dilemma, it is critical to note that it presents
just two visions of reform. There are, of course, other ways to envision
the future of the criminal legal system. For instance, even before the
world-wide protests over police brutality in the wake of George
Floyd’s murder, the Movement for Black Lives was highlighting the
weaknesses of typical police reforms and calling instead for a much
more profound reimagining of public safety. 172 As I explore in this
Part’s Section C.2, this sort of reimagining is happening regarding
criminal courts as well. 173
But I focus on these two voices because the unresolved debate about
the benefits of transparency versus flexibility is an essential part of
what allows lying, in particular, and plea bargaining, more generally,
to continue. Further, the debate pushes us to imagine more profound
revolutions in criminal justice reform. Though this Article does not lay
out a specific vision of transformation, it contributes to our
understanding of such transformation as the only path towards a just
system. Although, as this Part outlines, much could be done to improve
the system right now, current suggestions for repairing the plea system

169. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
170. For instance, Andrew Keane Woods argues that transparency comes with certain costs to the legal
system, including narrowing the range of interpretations for what the law means, which, in turn, limits the
law’s expressive power. Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16–22,
25–38 (2018); see also Brigham Daniels, Mark Buntaine & Tanner Bangerter, Testing Transparency, 114
NW. U. L. REV. 1263, 1274, 1325 (2020) (arguing that empirical testing indicates that the benefits of
administrative transparency to a healthy democracy may be overstated).
171. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
172. The Demilitarization of Law Enforcement, M4BL, https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/thedemilitarization-of-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/MA28-V26Y]; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a
Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 416–18, 421–26 (2018).
173. See infra Part III.C.2.
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will only go so far because of the deadlock described here. But in
understanding this deadlock, we see the limits of the current voices for
reform.
1. The Reformer’s Dilemma
What then does the paradox look like as a reformer’s dilemma? To
illustrate the point, let us assume that both the reformer demanding
more transparency (the “pro-transparency reformer”) and the reformer
who sees danger in that transparency (the “pro-flexibility reformer”)
are seeking the same thing: more just resolutions and an overall fairer
system.
So, what do pro-transparency reformers say in favor of this reform?
They focus on the arguments made in Part III.B.174 Lying means that
at the macro-level, criminal justice data is flawed, and at the
micro-level, some of the more sympathetic and compelling cases,
which would make for real fodder for reform, are being diverted from
the system in ways that do not reflect the true facts of the case. From
a data perspective, the lack of transparency means that convictions are
not markers of guilt because it is impossible to know the truth behind
how and why defendants are being convicted. To put it differently, it
is impossible to know which defendants benefit from lying. Lawyers
have created workarounds to the system for many defendants, but
presumably some defendants suffer the collateral consequences or
mandatory minimums imposed by legislatures. Yet how can we know
which defendants benefit from lying and which do not?
This data is further altered because, like many benefits that
defendants receive, the benefits from lying in plea bargaining are
influenced by one’s lawyer’s skills, the geographic region in which the
plea takes place, the prosecutor negotiating the plea, the judge who
will preside over the plea colloquy, and other hard-to-measure factors.
In addition, the defendant’s race plays a role because we know that
Black defendants fare worse across the criminal system, including in

174. See supra Part III.B.
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the negotiation of favorable pleas. 175 But the lack of transparency
means we have no way of measuring who is and is not receiving the
benefits of lying, and why or why not some lawyers engage in these
practices whereas others do not.
Furthermore, we have no way of tapping into the stories of those
defendants who are being diverted from the actual consequences of
their charges through lying. The lack of these stories should worry us
because of the power of narrative to shape the law. 176 The narratives
we tell about the law are critical in swaying juries and judges alike, but
they also resonate with the public, who use individual stories about
crime and justice to inform their view of the criminal justice system.
Usually, this phenomenon works in one direction, with the public
pushing for harsher laws and longer sentences based on compelling
individual stories.177 But there is reason to believe that given recent
movements in criminal justice reform, compelling stories about
individual defendants would work in the other direction as well.
By concentrating the public’s attention on individual stories of
suffering and harm, the Black Lives Matter movement has focused the
world’s attention on the racist roots of the criminal justice system and
the resulting daily violence and indignities the criminal system inflicts
on Black Americans. 178 The media has increasingly been open to the
stories of those impacted by the criminal legal system. The rapper
Meek Mill, for instance, received a tremendous amount of media
attention about his torturous experience with the Pennsylvania parole
system, which sparked reform efforts in his home city of Philadelphia
and elsewhere.179

175. Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187,
1213–15 (2018).
176. Johnson, supra note 102, at 136–37.
177. Jennifer K. Wood, In Whose Name? Crime Victim Policy and the Punishing Power of Protection,
NWSA J., Fall 2005, at 1, 4.
178. About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/PU5VAH3J].
179. Bobby Allyn, Meek Mill Pleads Guilty to Misdemeanor Gun Charge, Ends 12-Year Legal Case,
NPR (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/27/754769378/meek-mill-pleads-guilty-tomisdemeanor-gun-charge-ends-12-year-legal-case [https://perma.cc/974Z-ELUR]. For more information
regarding Meek Mill’s non-profit focusing on criminal justice reform, see, for example, About Us,
REFORM ALL., https://reformalliance.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/8P33-QWDD].
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Further, even in the world of sex offender laws, sympathetic stories
about children and young adults placed on the sex offender registry for
consensual sexting or other activities sparked a somewhat successful
push to reform registration laws.180 Quite simply, public interest in
these stories means there is hope for changing the system.
Scholars have argued that these feedback loops between the public
and policymakers may indeed have an impact on law reform. 181 The
“punitive turn” in American criminal justice was, at least partly, the
result of actual changes in the level and severity of crime. 182 But even
very popular laws that were meant to combat this rise in crime have
seen public backlash that led to changes in the laws, or at least in their
enforcement. For instance, New York repealed the draconian
Rockefeller Drug Laws, at least partially in response to public disgust
with them.183 Now, local elections of progressive prosecutors across
the country indicate that the public may be open to reducing the power
and scope of the criminal system in other ways. Also, legislatures may
be taking seriously a new public consciousness about the criminal
system, as indicated by the First Step Act at the federal level and
several criminal justice reform efforts at the state level. 184 Most
recently, Black Lives Matter protests led to legislative action on police

180. Lustbader, supra note 158; Dara Lind, Why the Sex Offender Registry Isn’t the Right Way to Punish
Rapists, VOX (July 5, 2016, 10:50 AM), [https://www.vox.com/2016/7/5/11883784/sex-offender-registry
[https://perma.cc/RQ4J-TKH4] (noting offenses such as consensual sex as teenagers and pulling down
siblings’ pants as children can put someone on a sex offender registry).
181. See, e.g., Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
828–31 (2016).
182. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal
Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 885 (2013).
183. Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 678 (2017) (book review).
184. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see generally Nicole D. Porter, Top Trends
in State Criminal
Justice Reform, 2020,
SENT’G PROJECT (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Top-Trends-in-State-Criminal-JusticeReform-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUK7-ZCNT] (discussing the focus in various states of reducing
incarceration and mitigating collateral consequences); Daniel Nichanian, Criminal Justice Reform in the
States: Spotlight on Legislatures, APPEAL, https://theappeal.org/political-report/legislative-round-up/
[https://perma.cc/F9RK-VYT6] (providing an interactive map of the United States, which highlights a
range of criminal justice reforms from changes to the felony murder rule to limits on qualified immunity
for state actors).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/8

50

Johnson: Lying at Plea Bargaining

2022]

LYING AT PLEA BARGAINING

723

reform.185 It is important to remember that plea bargaining, although a
regular feature of the criminal system, was largely in the shadows from
the 1920s to the 1970s.186 Although stakeholders understand how and
why plea bargaining is used, the public’s appreciation of plea
bargaining is still developing 187 and may be open to change.
Lying also harms the defendants who do not get the benefits of lying
in their own cases. There is a small but growing body of research on
defendant perspectives on plea bargaining indicating that defendants
often see the process of plea bargaining as unfair, even when they
believe they got a positive outcome. 188 This scholarship is in line with
research indicating that defendants’ perceptions of the legitimacy of
the criminal system are linked to the fairness of the process.189 The
benefits of plea bargaining are unevenly distributed among defendants,
including the benefits bestowed by lying. 190 Defendants are often
excluded, as much as the public, from the behind-the-scenes workings
of the plea process. 191 They may not have any sense of how the lawyers
negotiated the final charges, which taints their view of the fairness of
the process. Further, when a defendant sees that he has not received
some advantageous plea that some other defendant has achieved
through lying, that harms that defendant both materially—because he
did not receive the better deal—and psychologically—because he now
sees the system as illegitimate. Furthermore, defendants must,
185. See Vanessa Romo, Minneapolis Council Moves to Defund Police, Establish ‘Holistic’ Public
Safety Force, NPR (June 26, 2020, 8:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-forracial-justice/2020/06/26/884149659/minneapolis-council-moves-to-defund-police-establish-holisticpublic-safety-forc [https://perma.cc/B457-5GYB].
186. Dripps, supra note 182, at 886 (“Guilty pleas, which accounted for about four out of five
convictions through the 1970s, accounted for more than nine of ten by the end of the twentieth century.”);
William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1430–40 (2020).
187. Johnson, supra note 102, at 136–37 (noting that there are relatively few studies that assess what
the public understands about how plea bargaining works and whether it approves of the practice).
188. Jeanette Hussemann & Jonah Siegel, Pleading Guilty: Indigent Defendant Perceptions of the Plea
Process, 13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459, 495–96 (2019).
189. Id. at 471–72 (surveying the literature on perceptions of legitimacy and procedural justice).
190. Because of the transparency issues described in this Section, it is not clear which defendants do or
do not receive the benefits of certain forms of lying at plea bargaining. But the literature makes clear that
Black and Latino defendants fare worse than White defendants during plea bargaining generally. Berdejó,
supra note 175, at 1215; Testa & Johnson, supra note 155, at 519. There is no reason to suspect that this
trend would not also be true for plea bargains based on lies.
191. See Johnson, supra note 102.
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themselves, participate in lies of process, namely the plea colloquy,
which sends a damaging message that truth is not important in the
process or the outcome.
But what does the pro-flexibility reformer say in response to these
arguments? She argues that it is not so much that she supports plea
bargaining, but rather she is a realist who understands how the system
functions. She notes that transparency and a lack of flexibility threaten
real people. Like the Ohio State Public Defender who pushed back on
a requirement of a full factual record at the time of a plea, she will note
that the lies in the taxonomy are workarounds to injustice. She
understands the racist underpinnings of the American criminal
system,192 and she is skeptical that meaningful change will be
forthcoming until the country reckons with these roots.
In this sense, lying—and plea bargaining in general—may be
described as a “lesser evil.” Lying, although it may inflict the harms
described by the pro-transparency reformer, is still often better than
the alternative (not lying). If the defendant will be deported for a
low-level drug offense, which would leave his children orphaned, the
lesser evil is to fabricate a false plea that allows him and his family to
escape this fate. In this scenario, the liars—defendant, defense
attorney, prosecutor, and judge—may be committing the bad act of
lying, but they are doing it for a higher purpose. For instance, if one
encountered a murderer on his way to kill a victim, the moral choice
would be to lie to the murderer about the victim’s whereabouts rather
than tell the absolute truth if it would divert him from his wicked

192. See Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
16–20 (2022) (outlining the ways in which “White supremacy is foundational to the criminal courts’
violence and social control function”). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th Anniversary ed. 2020) (arguing that mass
incarceration of Black men serves as a form of control in the same way that Jim Crow laws used to);
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008) (describing how indentured servitude of the Black
community after the Civil War was an extension of slavery); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR (2007) (describing how crime and fear of it led to policies that have put millions of Americans in
prison); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing,
89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999) (outlining the harm caused to Black communities through the
enforcement of even “minor” crimes, like loitering and disorderly conduct).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/8

52

Johnson: Lying at Plea Bargaining

2022]

LYING AT PLEA BARGAINING

725

end.193 Indeed, mere omission or equivocation would not be sufficient
in this circumstance. Rather, there is a moral imperative to lie.194 And
here, the metaphorical murderer is the criminal system itself.
Legal scholars have also made this argument. In their piece, A
Welfarist Perspective on Lies, Ariel Porat and Omri Yadlin reason that
certain lies are valuable and therefore should be permitted because
they promote social goals.195 For instance, where a prospective
employee lies to a company about his religion because the company
intends to discriminate against him if it knows his true (as in accurate)
religion, a welfarist perspective would allow the employee to lie. 196
This is a version of the lesser-evil argument; to lie is bad, unless the
lie achieves the social value of avoiding what is both illegal and
immoral discrimination. Julia Simon-Kerr points out that this
consequentialist justification is why many legal actors lie. 197 For
instance, if the stakeholders believe the system will not produce just
results, they may feel permitted to lie. 198
The pro-flexibility reformer will also argue that transparency is
unlikely to even achieve the aims that the pro-transparency reformer is
after and may, in fact, make the system harsher. It is the policies and
practices of prosecutors and police that shape criminal law, not
legislatures. For decades, legislatures have only been responsive to
increasing the scope of criminal law, which furthers the discretion that
prosecutors and police have to define the actual contours of the law in
practice.199 Normative arguments by scholars about the scope of the
criminal system have had no impact on law-making.200 For these
reasons, the pro-flexibility reformer will argue transparency and a
tightening of the restrictions on lawyers will not achieve reform and
will only serve to hurt the real people processed through the system.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

This example came from BOK, supra note 40, at 40.
See id.
Porat & Yadlin, supra note 39, at 621.
Id. at 617, 618–20.
See generally Simon-Kerr, supra note 5.
Id. at 2209.
Stuntz, supra note 142, at 507, 509; see also Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103
IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1460 n.191 (2018) (noting with skepticism that more prosecution may cause
legislatures to pass fewer criminal laws).
200. Stuntz, supra note 142, at 507–08.
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Indeed, the pro-flexibility reformer will argue that transparency on
this issue will actually ramp up the harshness of the law. If legislatures
are alerted to the fact that prosecutors sometimes skirt sex offender
registration laws through the plea process, one—politically
appetizing—solution might be to legislatively ban such plea
bargaining, forcing nearly everyone arrested for a felony sex offense
to be registered as a sex offender. Or judges, if forced to be transparent
about all the horse-trading that occurs in their courtroom, may become
totally inflexible on plea bargaining in general, leading to poor
outcomes for defendants across the board.
The pro-flexibility advocate might also note that although more
transparency and less flexibility may lead to more trials, trials are not
necessarily a good thing for defendants or even prosecutors. Trials
subject both sides to the whims of jurors, who may be influenced by
bias201 or unable to understand complicated legal matters. And trials
also expose defendants to mandatory minimums and mandatory
collateral consequences—the very reasons that they resort to lying in
the first place.
In short, lying is meant to mitigate the effects of a cruel system;
transparency would only make that cruelty less escapable. For this
reason, the pro-flexibility reformer argues that the solution to the
problem is to view plea bargaining as something akin to civil
settlement, where the parties decide what is best for the two sides and
negotiate accordingly, even if such negotiations result in agreements
that are not entirely accurate. In this way, a different sort of
transparency is achieved; one in which the reality of the current system
is recognized, but the parties are given free rein to work around the
system where needed. This still leaves the possibility of reform around
the edges—for instance, through discovery reform—but keeps intact
the fundamental vehicle for achieving rough justice, the unfettered
plea bargain.

201. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 827, 835–47 (2012) (explaining the scope of implicit and explicit bias in juries).
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2. Future Visions for Reform
Of course, both reformers are correct: hence, the dilemma. So, what
then is the path forward for those who care about a fair and just
criminal system? There have been plenty of recent attempts to reform
the system, but each of those attempts tends to fall within one
reformer’s box or another, leaving us with the same dilemma.
For instance, as noted earlier in this Part, there have been efforts to
move toward a progressive prosecutor model. Although what
constitutes a “progressive” prosecutor is a matter of some debate, 202 in
general, those who claim the title of progressive prosecutor are
interested in using their wide discretion to help defendants get out from
under the power of unfair laws. 203 And though many progressive
prosecutors are more transparent about their practices, they cannot
change the laws. Rather, these prosecutors figure out ways to avoid the
worst of the law, largely putting themselves in the pro-flexibility camp
and using the power of the office to construct fair pleas.204
On the other side of the coin are legislative efforts to fix the system.
But while legislatures may attempt to make the legal system less
flexible and more transparent, those efforts tend to be limited and often
202. For instance, Natasha Irving, who was elected as a prosecutor in Maine in 2018 and has been called
a progressive prosecutor by others, calls herself a criminal justice reform prosecutor. S4, Episode 4:
Gender Justice, HI-PHI NATION, at 6:47 (May 23, 2020), https://hiphination.org/season-4-episodes/s4episode-4/ [https://perma.cc/2YTN-NEVZ]. She focuses her attention on restorative justice and increasing
the prosecution of rape and domestic violence crimes, even where the victim may not want to participate.
Id. at 7:35–11:31. Other prosecutors, like San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin, embrace the title
of progressive prosecutor and prioritize decarceration. Chesa Boudin, The Opportunity in Crisis: How
2020’s Challenges Present New Opportunities for Prosecutors, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY ONLINE
23, 37–53 (2020). For more on competing visions of what it means to be a progressive prosecutor, see
generally Bellin, supra note 52, which highlights the lack of a clear normative theory of the prosecutor’s
proper role; Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution: A Review of Charged by Emily Bazelon,
39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 218 (2020) (book review), for a discussion of alternative ways to view
prosecutorial discretion; and Steven Zeidman, Some Modest Proposals for a Progressive Prosecutor, 5
UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 23 (2021), for criticism of the limits of some efforts by progressive
prosecutors to reform the criminal system.
203. See Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecutors in a Pandemic, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 685, 690–94 (2020) (reviewing the policies of several self-proclaimed progressive
prosecutors).
204. Johnson, supra note 44, at 875–76 (discussing the political power of prosecutors). It is worth
noting that recent progressive prosecutors have claimed that their political power is limited compared to
their predecessors because they are often openly at odds with the local legislature. See Rollins, supra note
35, at 15:35.
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make the problems within the system worse, just as the pro-flexibility
reformer predicts. For instance, Congress’s past attempts to make
sentencing more uniform resulted in higher and often unfair
sentences.205 For just this reason, such sentences are often reworked
using fact bargaining.
More recent legislative efforts at reform tend to focus on repealing
or reforming specific laws. For instance, there has been tremendous
congressional focus on mens rea reform, which would make it harder
to secure convictions where the defendant did not act with a culpable
mental state.206 But reforms like this do not reevaluate the way that the
substantive criminal laws and, more importantly, sentencing and
collateral consequences schemes work together. 207 And the things that
most likely lead to lying at plea bargaining—like mandatory minimum
sentencing and mandatory collateral consequences—have been largely
untouched by reform efforts. Indeed, despite wide calls to abandon
mandatory minimums,208 they exist in every jurisdiction. And although
205. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729,
729 (2012) (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were created “to reduce unwarranted racial
disparities” in sentences, but that many stakeholders found that the guidelines lead to overly harsh
sentencing).
206. See generally RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44464, MENS REA REFORM: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW (Apr. 14, 2016), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44464.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZK3FQ6Q] (discussing several congressional mens rea reforms).
207. Although to be fair, there have been more recent broader efforts. For instance, in 2020, Oregon
residents voted to decriminalize personal possession of all drugs. E.g., German Lopez, America’s War on
Drugs Has Failed. Oregon Is Showing a Way Out., VOX (Nov. 11, 2020, 08:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21552710/oregon-drug-decriminalization-marijuana-legalization
[https://perma.cc/NLA4-AJWE]; Noelle Crombie, Oregon Decriminalizes Possession of Street Drugs,
Becoming
First
in
Nation,
O REGONIAN/OREGONLIVE,
https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2020/11/oregon-decriminalizes-possession-of-street-drugsbecoming-first-in-nation.html [https://perma.cc/4PSV-5SPF] (Nov. 4, 2020, 10:27 AM). And in 2019, the
State of Oregon also passed a bill that allows undocumented people to get Oregon driver’s licenses legally,
which will likely cut down on minor driving offenses for undocumented immigrants. Oregon DMV Opens
200,000 Appointment Slots as ‘Driver Licenses for All’ Takes Effect, KTVZ.COM (Nov. 13, 2020, 3:57
PM),
https://ktvz.com/community/community-billboard/2020/11/13/oregon-dmv-opens-200000appointment-slots-as-driver-licenses-for-all-takes-effect/ [https://perma.cc/988J-JXNS]; see Lizzy Acker,
Oregon Will Start Issuing Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented Immigrants in January,
OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE, https://www.oregonlive.com/commuting/2020/12/oregon-will-start-issuingdrivers-licenses-to-undocumented-immigrants-in-january.html [https://perma.cc/N8JQ-AZ8G] (Dec. 29,
2020, 1:37 PM).
208. E.g., A Federal Judge Says Mandatory Minimum Sentences Often Don’t Fit the Crime, NPR (June
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mandatory collateral consequences have been widely condemned by
various stakeholders,209 there are still over 40,000 mandatory collateral
consequences listed on the National Inventory of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction.210
Reform efforts that fail to address the interlocking nature of
substantive criminal law, procedural law, sentencing law, and
collateral consequences are unlikely to create a more just criminal
legal system. If reformers focus just on transparency or flexibility, they
will miss the legitimate reasons that lawyers hide plea bargaining in
the shadows. But a failure to think big and focus only on discreet
reform is unlikely to have a meaningful impact because lying is the
product of these knitted inputs.
Even with this mind, there are many reforms that could be
implemented that would make plea bargaining fairer for individuals
and more transparent to the outside world while also cutting down on
the need for lying at plea bargaining. These reforms, although useful,
can only go so far. It is still worth briefly mentioning them here.
First, legislatures should get rid of mandatory minimum sentencing
laws and mandatory collateral consequences that lead to much of the
lying at plea bargaining. Defendants are often trying to lie their way
around these punishments. As this Article makes clear, judges and
prosecutors are often willing to help defendants lie at plea bargaining.
This alone should justify the undoing of these much-critiqued
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and mandatory collateral
consequences laws.

1, 2017, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/01/531004316/a-federal-judge-says-mandatoryminimum-sentences-often-dont-fit-the-crime [https://perma.cc/GDZ6-TCZW]; Nancy Gertner & Chiraag
Bains, Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are Cruel and Ineffective. Sessions Wants Them Back., WASH.
POST (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/15/mandatoryminimum-sentences-are-cruel-and-ineffective-sessions-wants-them-back/
[https://perma.cc/4ZZPHNVW].
209. E.g., Leon Neyfakh, In a Remarkable Decision, Federal Judge Lays Out All the Ways Our Justice
System Hurts Ex-Cons, SLATE (May 25, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2016/05/frederic-block-federal-judge-speaks-out-against-collateral-consequences-forfelons.html [https://perma.cc/68TH-X4BM].
210. Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
CONVICTION, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences [https://perma.cc/6LZY8FPX] (click “search”).
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Second, plea bargaining should be—and could be—more
transparent. Even accounting for the type of secrecy that is sometimes
needed to protect individual defendants, there are still many ways to
take the plea process out of the shadows. In many cases, judges could
require the parties to disclose the plea history of the case. In a system
that has nearly eliminated public trials, there is no justification for the
absolutely shrouded nature of plea bargaining. Exceptions can be made
where necessary, but the rule should be that plea bargains are recorded
in writing and placed on the record for review, including any offers
made by the prosecutor and why such offers were made. 211
Third, despite the many potential flaws with the data, stakeholders
and policymakers should still collect and study the data. Both parties
should have some understanding of what crimes defendants are being
arrested for and how those crimes are resolved after plea bargaining.
The parties should also care about who is getting the benefit of
particular plea bargains and who is being excluded. Black defendants
fare more poorly than similarly situated White defendants across the
board in the criminal system. 212 The few studies on plea bargaining
echo this trend, but there should be more work in this area to
understand the disparate impact of plea bargaining and whether such
pleas are based on lies.
Fourth, there are many other reforms that would make the entire plea
system fairer and, by extension, more transparent and less prone
towards lying. As many commentators have noted, there should be
robust pre-plea discovery reform, of the kind recently implemented in
New York.213 Defendants should not plead guilty without an
opportunity to understand the nature of the evidence against them and
211. This suggestion was made by Jenia I. Turner in her paper, Transparency in Plea Bargaining.
Turner, supra note 23, at 1006. Her paper lays out a series of useful measures that every courtroom should
adopt to create a more transparent plea process, including creating a searchable database of pleas and
strengthening the role of judicial review at the plea phase. Id. at 1000–21.
212. Berdejó, supra note 175, at 1213, 1215.
213. Rebecca C. Lewis, What to Know About New York’s New Discovery Laws, CITY & ST. N.Y. (Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2020/02/what-to-know-about-new-yorks-newdiscovery-laws/176409/ [https://perma.cc/794P-NQHN]; see also Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich,
Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 285, 380 (2016) (finding that pre-plea open-file discovery policies lead to more informed guilty
pleas); Miller, supra note 114, at 273 (arguing for an explicit right to Brady material pre-plea).
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any exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor possesses. Defendants
should not be held on bail pre-trial, except in extraordinary cases, nor
should they be forced to waive their constitutional rights, including
sometimes the right to appeal even in the face of new evidence of
innocence,214 just to get the benefit of the plea. These practices are
coercive and drive even innocent defendants to accept guilty pleas. 215
Implementing these reforms would fundamentally alter the current
system in important ways, and they should be pursued. Indeed, any
reform that faces the realities of the plea system head on, even if it fails
to disentangle all the pieces, may have the benefit of creating broader
visions for further reform.216 But we should understand that broader
visions of reform and transformation are not just useful but necessary.
Even if all the reforms listed above were realized, they would not
eliminate the need to lie.
And to fix these problems, the entire system likely needs to be
reworked and reimagined. As Matthew Clair and Amanda Woog noted
in their work on abolition and the criminal courts, there have been a
long list of reforms to the criminal court system that have only had a
modest impact on making the system more equitable. 217 Because of
this, they reimagine the criminal court system—and all that goes along
with it, including plea bargaining—from an abolitionist perspective
that focuses on three central principles: power shifting, defunding and
reinvesting, and transformation. 218 Their vision “necessitates
imagining concrete alternatives rather than offering only modest
214. Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas, 10 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 671, 709–27 (2020) (arguing for a right to prove innocence via appeal after pleading guilty).
215. Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting the Lasting
Implications of Collateral Consequences Against Pretrial Detention in Decisions to Plead Guilty, 24
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 204, 213–14 (2018) (explaining the results of the authors’ study, which found
that pretrial detention increases the likelihood that even innocent people will plead guilty); Miller, supra
note 114, at 273 (demonstrating the dangers to defendants of pleading guilty without an understanding of
the exculpatory evidence against them); Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952,
960–65 (2012) (outlining the use of plea waivers to bar defendants from requesting future DNA testing).
216. As Allegra McLeod writes, in response to concerns that decarceration reform may be a lost cause,
“[i]n the end, after all, there is generally no way out but through. There is no way of confronting present
injustice other than by making do—making the most of the opportunities and circumstances at hand.”
McLeod, supra note 183, at 689 (responding to the bleak outlook on reform presented in MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015)).
217. Clair & Woog, supra note 192, at 25.
218. Id. at 7, 25.
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tweaks to existing arrangements.”219 This reimagining is what is
missing from the reformer’s dilemma, largely because criminal justice
reform has often been cabined by a lack of imagination about what the
criminal system could look like. As Amna A. Akbar has written about
in the context of police reform, the “reform and repair” models for
improving policing persist, at least in part, because of “the difficulty
[in] seeing alternatives.”220
The purpose of this Article is not to lay out a particular alternative
vision for transformation but rather to make clear why some
vision—separate and apart from discrete legal reforms—is necessary.
Lying is a symptom not of some hidden disease within the body of
system; rather the disease is the system and an exploration of lying at
plea bargaining shows just how all-encompassing the illness is.
Measures like discovery reform, the collection of more data, and other
reforms described above will have a salutary effect on the disease, but
they will not heal the body.221 For that, we need something closer to a
total reimaging rather than reform around the edges. There are many
compelling proposals for transformation, including from the
Movement for Black Lives and affiliated groups, who are amplifying
a long-standing advocacy that asks us to recognize the foundations of
American criminal law, to tear down existing structures, and to rebuild
a truly equitable legal process.222 More transparency or more
flexibility to lie at plea bargaining will not get us to a fairer legal
system.

219. Id. at 26.
220. Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1814
(2020).
221. See supra text accompanying note 212 and note 213 and accompanying text.
222. For instance, some of the proposals in the Vision for Black Lives Platform include “End to All
Jails, Prisons and Immigration Detention,” “End the Death Penalty,” “End the War on Drugs,” and “End
to Pretrial Detention and Money Bail,” among others. Vision for Black Lives, M4BL,
https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/M8D3-FWP2]. The Movement for Black Lives
comprises fifty organizations. Partners, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/partners/
[https://perma.cc/3LTQ-U4M5]. The Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation is a separate
organization with several affiliated partners, including The Black Alliance for Just Immigration and the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, among others. Id.
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CONCLUSION
It is deeply troubling that judges and lawyers on both of sides of the
aisle often believe that the only path to justice in the modern criminal
legal system is paved with lies. To merely call for more transparency
and less flexibility that would eliminate such lies misses the critical
point—lying provides many legitimate benefits to stakeholders in a
system that has grown bloated with thousands of substantive criminal
laws, mandatory minimum sentences, and collateral consequences.
But to say that lying is to be tolerated or even encouraged is to give up
on the idea that the criminal justice system can deliver both truth and
justice. This state of affairs poses a reformer’s dilemma: should one
seek truth through transparency or rough justice through unlimited plea
bargaining? As this Article makes clear, the dilemma fails to account
for a third option—a reimagining of what the criminal legal system
could and should look like.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

61

